The demandingness of morality: toward a reflective equilibrium

Abstract

It is common for philosophers to reject otherwise plausible moral theories on the ground that they are objectionably demanding, and to endorse "Moderate" alternatives. I argue that while support can be found within the method of reflective equilibrium for Moderate moral principles of the kind that are often advocated, it is much more difficult than Moderates have supposed to provide support for the view that morality's demands in circumstances like ours are also Moderate. Once we draw a clear distinction between Moderate accounts of the content of moral principles, and Moderate accounts of morality's demands in circumstances like ours, we can see that defenses of Moderate views that include both of these components are subject to both methodological and substantive objections. I consider arguments for Moderate views that have been made by Samuel Scheffler and Richard Miller, and argue that both are methodologically problematic because they rely on appeals to intuitions that we have strong grounds to think are unreliable. I conclude that we must take seriously the possibility that Moderate principles, applied to well off people in circumstances like ours, imply demands that are much more extensive than Moderates typically accept.

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