The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - current issue
A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle
Gandenberger, G., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
I present a new proof of the likelihood principle that avoids two responses to a well-known proof due to Birnbaum ([1962]). I also respond to arguments that Birnbaum’s proof is fallacious, which if correct could be adapted to this new proof. On the other hand, I urge caution in interpreting proofs of the likelihood principle as arguments against the use of frequentist statistical methods.- 1 Introduction
- 2 The New Proof
- 3 How the New Proof Addresses Proposals to Restrict Birnbaum’s Premises
- 4 A Response to Arguments that the Proofs Are Fallacious
- 5 Conclusion
The Genomic Challenge to Adaptationism
Sarkar, S., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
Since the late 1990s, the characterization of complete DNA sequences for a large and taxonomically diverse set of species has continued to gain in speed and accuracy. Sequence analyses have indicated a strikingly baroque structure for most eukaryotic genomes, with multiple repeats of DNA sequences and with very little of the DNA specifying proteins. Much of the DNA in these genomes has no known function. These results have generated strong interest in the factors that govern the evolution of genome architecture. While adaptationist ‘just so’ stories have been offered (as typically occurs in every area of biology), recent theoretical analyses based on mathematical population genetics strongly suggest that non-adaptive processes dominate genome architecture evolution. This article critically synthesizes and develops these arguments, explicating a core argument along with several variants. It provides a critical assessment of the evidence that supports these arguments’ premises. It also analyses adaptationist responses to these arguments and notes potential problems with the core argument. These theoretical analyses continue the molecular reinterpretation of evolution initiated by the neutral theory in 1968. The article ends by noting that some of these arguments can also be extended to evolution at higher levels of organization which raises questions about adaptationism in general. This remains a puzzle because there is probably little reason to doubt that many organismic features are genuine adaptations.
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries: Senses of Adaptationism
3 Genome Architecture
3.1 Surprises of early eukaryotic genetics
3.2 Genome structure, post-2001
4 The Case against Adaptationism
4.1 Just so stories versus population genetics
4.2 The core argument
4.3 Three variants of the core argument
4.4 Examples: Non-adaptive features of the genome
5 Adaptationist Responses
6 Concluding Remarks
Symmetry, Empirical Equivalence, and Identity
Friederich, S., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
The article proposes a novel approach to the much discussed question of which symmetries have ‘direct empirical significance’ and which do not. The approach is based on a development of a recently proposed framework by Hilary Greaves and David Wallace, who claim that, contrary to the standard folklore among philosophers of physics, ‘local’ symmetries may have direct empirical significance no less than ‘global’ ones. Partly vindicating the standard folklore, a result is derived here from a number of plausible assumptions, that states that local symmetries can indeed have no direct empirical significance. Ways to interpret the result are considered and possible morals are outlined.
1 Introduction
2 Greaves and Wallace on Interior versus Non-interior Symmetries
3 Elaborating on the Greaves/Wallace Framework
4 The Result
5 Problems with ’t Hooft’s Beam Splitter
6 Summary and Conclusion
Searching for Darwinism in Generalized Darwinism
Reydon, T. A. C., Scholz, M., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
While evolutionary thinking is increasingly becoming popular in fields of investigation outside the biological sciences, it remains unclear how helpful it is there and whether it actually yields good explanations of the phenomena under study. Here we examine the ontology of a recent approach to applying evolutionary thinking outside biology, the generalized Darwinism (GD) approach proposed by Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen. We examine the ontology of populations in biology and in GD, and argue that biological evolutionary theory sets ontological criteria that GD fails to meet. We suggest two options to revise the population concept in GD: reformulating the concept in terms of inheritance and reproduction such that it comes to pick out individuals similar to evolving populations, or trying to build an adequate population concept on a principle of differential retention instead of differential reproduction.
1 Introduction
2 Generalized Darwinism
2.1 What is generalized Darwinism?
2.2 Darwinian principles
3 The Ontology of Generalized Darwinism: What Are Populations?
3.1 The population concept of generalized Darwinism
3.2 The population concept in evolutionary theory
4 Locating Evolving Systems in Generalized Darwinism
5 Conclusion
Probability and the Explanatory Virtues
Glymour, C., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
Recent literature in philosophy of science has addressed purported notions of explanatory virtues—‘explanatory power’, ‘unification’, and ‘coherence’. In each case, a probabilistic relation between a theory and data is said to measure the power of an explanation, or degree of unification, or degree of coherence. This essay argues that the measures do not capture cases that are paradigms of scientific explanation, that the available psychological evidence indicates that the measures do not capture judgements of explanatory power, and, finally, that the measures do not provide useful methods for selecting hypotheses.
1. Introduction
2. Some Proposed Measures of Explanatory Virtues
3. Descriptive Inadequacy
3.1 Excellent but false explanations
3.2 Causal explanation
4. Psychological Inadequacy
5. Finding the Truth
6. Conclusion
No Categorial Support for Radical Ontic Structural Realism
Lam, V., Wuthrich, C., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
Radical ontic structural realism (ROSR) asserts an ontological commitment to ‘free-standing’ physical structures understood solely in terms of fundamental relations, without any recourse to relata that stand in these relations. Bain ([2013 ], pp.1621–35) has recently defended ROSR against the common charge of incoherence by arguing that a reformulation of fundamental physical theories in category-theoretic terms (rather than the usual set-theoretic ones) offers a coherent and precise articulation of the commitments accepted by ROSR. In this essay, we argue that category theory does not offer a more hospitable environment to ROSR than set theory. We also show that the application of category-theoretic tools to topological quantum field theory and to algebraic generalizations of general relativity do not warrant the claim that these theories describe ‘object-free’ structures. We conclude that category theory offers little if any comfort to ROSR.
1 Introduction: Ridding Structures of Objects
2 The Set-theoretic Peril for Radical Ontic Structural Realism
3 Bain’s Categorial Strategy to Save Radical Ontic Structural Realism
4 Throwing out the Relations with the Relata
5 Categorial and Set-theoretical Structures
6 Radical Suggestions from Topological Quantum Field Theory?
7 Sheaves of Einstein Algebras as Radical Structures?
8 Conclusions
Autonomous-Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Ariew, A., Rice, C., Rohwer, Y., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
1 Introduction
2 Shapiro and Sober’s ‘Epiphenomenalism Do’s and Don’ts’
3 WALM’s Explanatory Doctrine
4 Galton’s Autonomous-Statistical Explanation
5 A Second Example: The Statistical Explanation of the Diffusion of Gases
6 Distinguishing Two Theories of Evolution by Natural Selection
7 A Possible Objection: Are Statistical Laws Sufficient for Explanation?
8 Conclusion
Belief Update across Fission
Schwarz, W., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
When an agent undergoes fission, how should the beliefs of the fission results relate to the pre-fission beliefs? This question is important for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it is of independent philosophical interest. Among other things, fission scenarios demonstrate that ‘self-locating’ information can affect the probability of uncentred propositions even if an agent has no essentially self-locating uncertainty. I present a general update rule for centred beliefs that gives sensible verdicts in cases of fission, without relying on controversial metaphysical or linguistic assumptions. The rule is supported by the same considerations that support standard conditioning in the traditional framework of uncentred propositions.
1 The Problem
2 Conditioning and Self-location
3 Shifted Conditioning
4 Transition Probabilities
5 Ockhamism
6 Diachronic Rationality
7 Consequences and Conclusions
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson
Bradley, D., 2015-09-14 12:22:03 AM
In Bradley ([2011b]), I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics (EQM). I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson ([forthcoming]) agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s ([2000]) thirder argument on Sleeping Beauty and, second, argue that the analogy I draw between Sleeping Beauty and EQM fails. I will argue that neither point succeeds.
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Wilson’s Argument for 1/3 in Sleeping Beauty
4 Reply: Explaining Away the Crazy
5 Wilson's Argument for the Breakdown of the Analogy
6 Reply: The Irrelevance of Chance
7 Conclusion
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