- A brief account of the history of logic, from the The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (edited by Ted Honderich), OUP 1997, 497-500.
- A biography of Peter Abelard, published in the Dictionary of Literary Biography Vol. 115, edited by Jeremiah Hackett, Detroit: Gale Publishing, 3-15.
- Philosophy in the Latin Christian West, 750-1050, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Jorge Gracia and Tim Noone, Blackwell 2003, 32-35.
- Ockham wielding his razor!
- Review of The Beatles Anthology, Chronicle Books 2000 (367pp).
- A brief discussion note about Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.
- Review of St. Thomas Aquinas by Ralph McInerny, University of Notre Dame Press 1982 (172pp). From International Philosophical Quarterly23 (1983), 227-229.
- Review of William Heytesbury on Maxima and Minima by John Longeway, D.Reidel 1984 (x+201pp). From The Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 146-149.
- Review of That Most Subtle Question by D. P. Henry, Manchester University Press 1984 (xviii+337pp). From The Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 149-152.
- Review of Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages by Jorge Gracia, Catholic University of America Press 1984 (303pp). From The Philosophical Review 97 (1988), 564-567.
- Review of Introduction to Medieval Logic by Alexander Broadie, OUP 1987 (vi+150pp). From The Philosophical Review 99 (1990), 299-302.
Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts
Monday, January 11, 2010
"Parable of the Invisible Gardener" by John Wisdom,
John Wisdom (1904–1993) was a leading British philosopher considered to be an ordinary language philosopher, a philosopher of mind and a metaphysician.
He was influenced by G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Sigmund Freud, and in turn explained and extended their work.
Wisdom was for most of his career at Trinity College, Cambridge, and became Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University. Near the end of his career he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1950 to 1951.
His famous "Parable of the Invisible Gardener" is a profound dialectic on the existence or absence of God.
...
It is often used to illustrate the perceived differences between assertions based on faith and assertions based on scientific evidence, and the problems associated with unfalsifiable beliefs. The tale runs as follows:
"Two people return to their long neglected garden and find, among the weeds, that a few of the old plants are surprisingly vigorous. One says to the other, 'It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these weeds.' The other disagrees and an argument ensues. They pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. The believer wonders if there is an invisible gardener, so they patrol with bloodhounds but the bloodhounds never give a cry. Yet the believer remains unconvinced, and insists that the gardener is invisible, has no scent and gives no sound. The sceptic doesn't agree, and asks how a so-called invisible, intangible, elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener, or even no gardener at all."
He was influenced by G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Sigmund Freud, and in turn explained and extended their work.
Wisdom was for most of his career at Trinity College, Cambridge, and became Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University. Near the end of his career he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1950 to 1951.
His famous "Parable of the Invisible Gardener" is a profound dialectic on the existence or absence of God.
...
It is often used to illustrate the perceived differences between assertions based on faith and assertions based on scientific evidence, and the problems associated with unfalsifiable beliefs. The tale runs as follows:
"Two people return to their long neglected garden and find, among the weeds, that a few of the old plants are surprisingly vigorous. One says to the other, 'It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these weeds.' The other disagrees and an argument ensues. They pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. The believer wonders if there is an invisible gardener, so they patrol with bloodhounds but the bloodhounds never give a cry. Yet the believer remains unconvinced, and insists that the gardener is invisible, has no scent and gives no sound. The sceptic doesn't agree, and asks how a so-called invisible, intangible, elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener, or even no gardener at all."
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
"The Mirror of Production" and "Symbolic Exchange and Death" by Jean Baudrillard,1976,
French theorist Jean Baudrillard was one of the foremost intellectual figures of the present age whose work combines philosophy, social theory, and an idiosyncratic cultural metaphysics that reflects on key events of phenomena of the epoch.
A sharp critic of contemporary society, culture, and thought, Baudrillard is often seen as a major guru of French postmodern theory, although he can also be read as a thinker who combines social theory and philosophy in original and provocative ways and a writer who has developed his own style and forms of writing.
He was an extremely prolific author who has published over thirty books and commented on some of the most salient cultural and sociological phenomena of the contemporary era, including the erasure of the distinctions of gender, race, and class that structured modern societies in a new postmodern consumer, media, and high tech society; the mutating roles of art and aesthetics; fundamental changes in politics, culture, and human beings; and the impact of new media, information, and cybernetic technologies in the creation of a qualitatively different social order, providing fundamental mutations of human and social life.
For some years a cult figure of postmodern theory, Baudrillard moved beyond the postmodern discourse from the early 1980s to the present, and has developed a highly idiosyncratic mode of philosophical and cultural analysis.
This entry focuses on the development of Baudrillard's unique modes of thought and how he moved from social theory to postmodern theory to a provocative type of philosophical analysis.
In retrospect, Baudrillard can be seen a theorist who has traced in original ways the life of signs and impact of technology on social life, and who has systematically criticized major modes of modern thought, while developing his own philosophical perspectives.
...........................................
Symbolic Exchange and the Postmodern Break :
The Mirror of Production and his next book Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976),
a major text finally translated in 1993,
are attempts to provide ultraradical perspectives that overcome the limitations of an economistic Marxist tradition that privileges the economic sphere.
This ultra-leftist phase of Baudrillard's itinerary would be short-lived, however, though in Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard produces one of his most important and dramatic provocations. The text opens with a Preface that condenses his attempt to provide a significantly different approach to society and culture.
Building on the French cultural theory of Georges Bataille, Marcel Mauss, and Alfred Jarry, Baudrillard champions “symbolic exchange” which resists capitalist values of utility and monetary profit for cultural values.
Baudrillard argues that in Bataille's claim that expenditure and excess is connected with sovereignty, Mauss's descriptions of the social prestige of gift-giving in premodern society, Jarry's theater that ridicules French culture, and Saussure's anagrams, there is a break with the values of capitalist exchange and production, or the production of meaning in linguistic exchange.
These cases of “symbolic exchange,” Baudrillard believes, break with the values of production and describe poetic exchange and creative cultural activity that provides alternatives to the capitalist values of production and exchange.
The term “symbolic exchange” was derived from Georges Bataille's notion of a “general economy” where expenditure, waste, sacrifice, and destruction were claimed to be more fundamental to human life than economies of production and utility (1988 [1967]).
Bataille's model was the sun that freely expended its energy without asking anything in return. He argued that if individuals wanted to be truly sovereign (e.g., free from the imperatives of capitalism) they should pursue a “general economy” of expenditure, giving, sacrifice, and destruction to escape determination by existing imperatives of utility.
For Bataille, human beings were beings of excess with exorbitant energy, fantasies, drives, needs, and heterogeneous desire. At this point, Baudrillard presupposes the truth of Bataille's anthropology and general economy.
In a 1976 review of a volume of Bataille's Complete Works, Baudrillard writes: “The central idea is that the economy which governs our societies results from a misappropriation of the fundamental human principle, which is a solar principle of expenditure” (1987: 57).
In the early 1970s, Baudrillard took over Bataille's anthropological position and what he calls Bataille's “aristocratic critique” of capitalism that he now claims is grounded in the crass notions of utility and savings rather than the more sublime “aristocratic” notion of excess and expenditure.
Bataille and Baudrillard presuppose here a contradiction between human nature and capitalism. They maintain that humans “by nature” gain pleasure from such things as expenditure, waste, festivities, sacrifices, and so on, in which they are sovereign and free to expend the excesses of their energy (and thus to follow their “real nature”). The capitalist imperatives of labor, utility, and savings by implication are “unnatural,” and go against human nature.
Baudrillard argues that the Marxian critique of capitalism, by contrast, merely attacks exchange value while exalting use value and thus utility and instrumental rationality, thereby “seeking a good use of the economy.”
MARXISM
For Baudrillard:Marxism is therefore only a limited petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalization of life toward the ‘good use’ of the social!
Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with his death. One can accuse this perspective of being pre- or post-Marxist. At any rate, Marxism is only the disenchanted horizon of capital — all that precedes or follows it is more radical than it is (1987: 60).
NIETZCHE
This passage is highly revealing and marks Baudrillard's switch to an “aristocratic critique” of political economy deeply influenced by Bataille and Nietzsche.
For Bataille and Baudrillard are presenting a version of Nietzsche's aristocratic “master morality” where “superior” individuals create their own values and their life articulates an excess, overflow, and intensification of creative and erotic energies. For some time, Baudrillard would continue to attack the bourgeoisie, capital, and political economy, but from a perspective which champions “aristocratic” expenditure and sumptuary, aesthetic and symbolic values. The dark side of his switch in theoretical and political allegiances is a valorization of (i.e., a giving or assigning of value to) sacrifice and death that informs Symbolic Exchange and Death (in which sacrifice provides a giving that subverts bourgeois values of utility and self-preservation, an idea that has sinister implications in an era of suicide bombings and terrorism).
PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIETES
On the whole, in his mid-1970s work, Baudrillard was extricating himself from the familiar Marxian universe of production and class struggle into a quite different neo-aristocratic and metaphysical world-view.
Baudrillard seems to assume at this point that pre-capitalist societies were governed by forms of symbolic exchange similar to Bataille's notion of a general economy.
Influenced by Mauss' theory of the gift and countergift, Baudrillard claimed that pre-capitalist societies were governed by laws of symbolic exchange rather than production and utility.
Developing these ideas, Baudrillard sketched a fundamental dividing line in history between symbolic societies — i.e., societies fundamentally organized around premodern exchange — and productivist societies (i.e., societies organized around production and commodity exchange).
He thus rejects the Marxian philosophy of history which posits the primacy of production in all societies and rejects the Marxian concept of socialism, arguing that it does not break radically enough with capitalist productivism, offering itself merely as a more efficient and equitable organization of production rather than as a completely different sort of society with a different values and forms of culture and life.
REVOLUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE
Henceforth, Baudrillard would contrast — in one way or another — his ideal of symbolic exchange to the values of production, utility, and instrumental rationality that govern capitalist (and socialist) societies.
“Symbolic exchange” thus emerges as Baudrillard's “revolutionary” alternative to the values and practices of capitalist society, and stands for a variety of heterogeneous activities in his 1970s writings.
For instance, he writes in the Critique: “The exchange of looks, the present which comes and goes, are like the air people breathe in and out. This is the metabolism of exchange, prodigality, festival — and also of destruction (which returns to non-value what production has erected, valorized). In this domain, value isn't even recognized” (1981: 207).
MIRROR OF PRODUCTION
He also describes his conception of symbolic exchange in The Mirror of Production where he writes: “The symbolic social relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the consumption of the ‘surplus' and deliberate anti-production” (1975: 143). The term therefore refers to symbolic or cultural activities which do not contribute to capitalist production and accumulation and which potentially constitute a “radical negation” of productivist society.
PREMODERN CULTURE
At this stage of his thought, Baudrillard stood in a French tradition of extolling “primitive” or premodern culture over the abstract rationalism and utilitarianism of modern society.
ROUSSEAU
Baudrillard's defense of symbolic exchange over production and instrumental rationality thus stands in the tradition of Rousseau's defense of the “natural savage” over modern man,
Durkheim's posing mechanical solidarities of premodern societies against the abstract individualism and anomie of modern ones, Bataille's valorization of expenditure of premodern societies,
or Mauss' or Levi-Strauss' fascination with the richness of “primitive societies” or “the savage mind.
” After deconstructing the modern master thinkers and his own theoretical fathers (Marx, Freud, Saussure, and his French contemporaries) for missing the richness of symbolic exchange, Baudrillard continues to champion the symbolic and radical forms of thought and writing in a quest that takes him into ever more esoteric and exotic discourse.
MAUSS-SAUSSURE-FREUD
Thus, against the organizing forms of modern thought and society, Baudrillard champions symbolic exchange as an alternative.
Against modern demands to produce value and meaning, Baudrillard calls for their extermination and annihilation, providing as examples,
Mauss's gift-exchange,
Saussure's anagrams, and
Freud's concept of the death drive.
In all of these instances, there is a rupture with the forms of exchange
of goods, meanings, and libidinal energies)
and thus an escape from the forms of production, capitalism, rationality, and meaning.
Baudrillard's paradoxical concept of symbolic exchange can be explained as expression of a desire to liberate himself from modern positions and to seek a revolutionary position outside of modern society.
Against modern values, Baudrillard advocates their annihilation and extermination.
In his mid-1970s work, however, Baudrillard posits another divide in history as radical as the rupture between premodern symbolic societies and modern ones. In the mode of classical social theory, he systematically develops distinctions between premodern societies organized around symbolic exchange, modern societies organized around production, and postmodern societies organized around “simulation” by which he means the cultural modes of representation that “simulate” reality as in television, computer cyberspace, and virtual reality. Baudrillard's distinction between the mode of production and utility that organized modern societies and the mode of simulation that he believes is the organizing form of postmodern societies postulates a rupture between modern and postmodern societies as great as the divide between modern and premodern ones. In theorizing the epochal postmodern rupture with modernity, Baudrillard declares the “end of political economy” and of an era in which production was the organizing form of society. Following Marx, Baudrillard argues that this modern epoch was the era of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, in which workers were exploited by capital and provided a revolutionary force of upheaval. Baudrillard, however, declared the end of political economy and thus the end of the Marxist problematic and of modernity itself:
The end of labor. The end of production. The end of political economy. The end of the signifier/signified dialectic which facilitates the accumulation of knowledge and of meaning, the linear syntagma of cumulative discourse. And at the same time, the end simultaneously of the exchange value/use value dialectic which is the only thing that makes accumulation and social production possible. The end of linear dimension of discourse. The end of the linear dimension of the commodity. The end of the classical era of the sign. The end of the era of production (Baudrillard 1993a: 8).
The discourse of “the end” signifies his announcing a postmodern break or rupture in history. People are now, Baudrillard claims, in a new era of simulation in which social reproduction (information processing, communication, and knowledge industries, and so on) replaces production as the organizing form of society. In this era, labor is no longer a force of production but is itself a “one sign amongst many” (1993a: 10). Labor is not primarily productive in this situation, but is a sign of one's social position, way of life, and mode of servitude. Wages too bear no rational relation to one's work and what one produces but to one's place within the system (1993a: 19ff.). But, crucially, political economy is no longer the foundation, the social determinant, or even a structural “reality” in which other phenomena can be interpreted and explained (31ff.). Instead people live in the “hyperreality” of simulations in which images, spectacles, and the play of signs replace the concepts of production and class conflict as key constituents of contemporary societies.
From now on, capital and political economy disappear from Baudrillard's story, or return in radically new forms. Henceforth, signs and codes proliferate and produce other signs and new sign machines in ever-expanding and spiraling cycles. Technology thus replaces capital in this story and semiurgy (interpreted by Baudrillard as proliferation of images, information, and signs) replaces production. His postmodern turn is thus connected to a form of technological determinism and a rejection of political economy as a useful explanatory principle — a move that many of his critics reject (see Kellner 1989 and the studies in Kellner 1994).
Symbolic Exchange and Death and the succeeding studies in Simulation and Simulacra (1994 [1981]) articulate the principle of a fundamental rupture between modern and postmodern societies and mark Baudrillard's departure from the problematic of modern social theory. For Baudrillard, modern societies are organized around the production and consumption of commodities, while postmodern societies are organized around simulation and the play of images and signs, denoting a situation in which codes, models, and signs are the organizing forms of a new social order where simulation rules.[5] In the society of simulation, identities are constructed by the appropriation of images, and codes and models determine how individuals perceive themselves and relate to other people. Economics, politics, social life, and culture are all governed by the mode of simulation, whereby codes and models determine how goods are consumed and used, politics unfold, culture is produced and consumed, and everyday life is lived.
Baudrillard's postmodern world is also one in which previously important boundaries and distinctions — such as those between social classes, genders, political leanings, and once autonomous realms of society and culture — lose power. If modern societies, for classical social theory, were characterized by differentiation, for Baudrillard, postmodern societies are characterized by dedifferentiation, the “collapse” of (the power of) distinctions, or implosion. In Baudrillard's society of simulation, the realms of economics, politics, culture, sexuality, and the social all implode into each other. In this implosive mix, economics is fundamentally shaped by culture, politics, and other spheres, while art, once a sphere of potential difference and opposition, is absorbed into the economic and political, while sexuality is everywhere. In this situation, differences between individuals and groups implode in a rapidly mutating or changing dissolution of the social and the previous boundaries and structures upon which social theory had once focused.
In addition, his postmodern universe is one of hyperreality in which entertainment, information, and communication technologies provide experiences more intense and involving than the scenes of banal everyday life, as well as the codes and models that structure everyday life. The realm of the hyperreal (e.g., media simulations of reality, Disneyland and amusement parks, malls and consumer fantasylands, TV sports, and other excursions into ideal worlds) is more real than real, whereby the models, images, and codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior. Yet determination itself is aleatory in a non-linear world where it is impossible to chart causal mechanisms in a situation in which individuals are confronted with an overwhelming flux of images, codes, and models, any of which may shape an individual's thought or behavior.
In this postmodern world, individuals flee from the “desert of the real” for the ecstasies of hyperreality and the new realm of computer, media, and technological experience. In this universe, subjectivities are fragmented and lost, and a new terrain of experience appears that for Baudrillard renders previous social theories and politics obsolete and irrelevant. Tracing the vicissitudes of the subject in present-day society, Baudrillard claims that contemporary subjects are no longer afflicted with modern pathologies like hysteria or paranoia. Rather, they exist in “a state of terror which is characteristic of the schizophrenic, an over-proximity of all things, a foul promiscuity of all things which beleaguer and penetrate him, meeting with no resistance, and no halo, no aura, not even the aura of his own body protects him. In spite of himself the schizophrenic is open to everything and lives in the most extreme confusion” (1988: 27). For Baudrillard, the “ecstasy of communication” means that the subject is in close proximity to instantaneous images and information, in an overexposed and transparent world. In this situation, the subject “becomes a pure screen a pure absorption and re-absorption surface of the influent networks” (1988: 27). In other words, an individual in a postmodern world becomes merely an entity influenced by media, technological experience, and the hyperreal.
Thus, Baudrillard's categories of simulation, implosion, and hyperreality combine to create an emergent postmodern condition that requires entirely new modes of theory and politics to chart and respond to the novelties of the contemporary era. His style and writing strategies are also implosive (i.e., working against previously important distinctions), combining material from strikingly different fields, studded with examples from the mass media and popular culture in an innovative mode of postmodern theory that does not respect disciplinary boundaries. His writing attempts to itself simulate the new conditions, capturing its novelties through inventive use of language and theory. Such radical questioning of contemporary theory and the need for new theoretical strategies are thus legitimated for Baudrillard by the large extent of changes in the current era.
For instance, Baudrillard claims that modernity operates with a mode of representation in which ideas represent reality and truth, concepts that are key postulates of modern theory. A postmodern society explodes this epistemology by creating a situation in which subjects lose contact with the real and fragment and dissolve. This situation portends the end of modern theory that operated with a subject-object dialectic in which the subject was supposed to represent and control the object. In the story of modern philosophy, the philosophic subject attempts to discern the nature of reality, to secure grounded knowledge, and to apply this knowledge to control and dominate the object (e.g., nature, other people, ideas, and so on). Baudrillard follows here the poststructuralist critique that thought and discourse could no longer be securely anchored in a priori or privileged structures of “the real.” Reacting against the mode of representation in modern theory, French thought, especially some deconstructionists (Rorty's “strong textualists”), moved into the play of textuality, of discourse, which allegedly referred only to other texts or discourses in which “the real” or an “outside” were banished to the realm of nostalgia.
In a similar fashion, Baudrillard, a “strong simulacrist,” claims that in the media and consumer society, people are caught up in the play of images, spectacles, and simulacra, that have less and less relationship to an outside, to an external “reality,” to such an extent that the very concepts of the social, political, or even “reality” no longer seem to have any meaning. And the narcoticized and mesmerized (some of Baudrillard's metaphors) media-saturated consciousness is in such a state of fascination with image and spectacle that the concept of meaning itself (which depends on stable boundaries, fixed structures, shared consensus) dissolves. In this alarming and novel postmodern situation, the referent, the behind and the outside, along with depth, essence, and reality all disappear, and with their disappearance, the possibility of all potential opposition vanishes as well. As simulations proliferate, they come to refer only to themselves: a carnival of mirrors reflecting images projected from other mirrors onto the omnipresent television and computer screen and the screen of consciousness, which in turn refers the image to its previous storehouse of images also produced by simulatory mirrors. Caught up in the universe of simulations, the “masses” are “bathed in a media massage” without messages or meaning, a mass age where classes disappear, and politics is dead, as are the grand dreams of disalienation, liberation, and revolution.
Baudrillard claims that henceforth the masses seek spectacle and not meaning. They implode into a “silent majority,” signifying “the end of the social” (1983b). Baudrillard implies that social theory loses its very object as meanings, classes, and difference implode into a “black hole” of non-differentiation. Fixed distinctions between social groupings and ideologies implode and concrete face-to-face social relations recede as individuals disappear in worlds of simulation — media, computers, virtual reality itself. Social theory itself thus loses its object, the social, while radical politics loses its subject and agency.
Nonetheless, he claims, at this point in his trajectory (i.e., the late 1970s and early 1980s) that refusal of meaning and participation by the masses is a form of resistance. Hovering between nostalgia and nihilism, Baudrillard at once exterminates modern ideas (e.g., the subject, meaning, truth, reality, society, socialism, and emancipation) and affirms a mode of symbolic exchange which appears to manifest a nostalgic desire to return to premodern cultural forms. This desperate search for a genuinely revolutionary alternative was abandoned, however, by the early 1980s. Henceforth, he develops yet more novel perspectives on the contemporary moment, vacillating between sketching out alternative modes of thought and behavior and renouncing the quest for political and social change.
In a sense, there is a parodic inversion of historical materialism in Baudrillard. In place of Marx's emphasis on political economy and the primacy of the economic, for Baudrillard it is the model, the superstructure, that generates the real in a situation he refers to as the “end of political economy” (1993a). For Baudrillard, sign values predominate over use values and exchange values; the materiality of needs and commodity use-values to serve them disappear in Baudrillard's semiological imaginary, in which signs take precedence over the real and reconstruct human life. Turning the Marxist categories against themselves, masses absorb classes, the subject of praxis is fractured, and objects come to rule human beings. Revolution is absorbed by the object of critique and technological implosion replaces the socialist revolution in producing a rupture in history. For Baudrillard, in contrast to Marx, the catastrophe of modernity and eruption of postmodernity is produced by the unfolding of technological revolution. Consequently, Baudrillard replaces Marx's hard economic and social determinism with its emphasis on the economic dimension, class struggle, and human praxis, with a form of semiological idealism and technological determinism where signs and objects come to dominate the subject.
Baudrillard thus concludes that the “catastrophe has happened,” that the destruction of modernity and modern theory which he noted in the mid-1970s, has been completed by the development of capitalist society itself, that modernity has disappeared and a new social situation has taken its place. Against traditional strategies of rebellion and revolution, Baudrillard begins to champion what he calls “fatal strategies” that push the values of the system to the extreme in the hopes of collapse or reversal, and eventually adopts a style of highly ironic metaphysical discourse that renounces emancipation and the discourse and hopes of progressive social transformation.
A sharp critic of contemporary society, culture, and thought, Baudrillard is often seen as a major guru of French postmodern theory, although he can also be read as a thinker who combines social theory and philosophy in original and provocative ways and a writer who has developed his own style and forms of writing.
He was an extremely prolific author who has published over thirty books and commented on some of the most salient cultural and sociological phenomena of the contemporary era, including the erasure of the distinctions of gender, race, and class that structured modern societies in a new postmodern consumer, media, and high tech society; the mutating roles of art and aesthetics; fundamental changes in politics, culture, and human beings; and the impact of new media, information, and cybernetic technologies in the creation of a qualitatively different social order, providing fundamental mutations of human and social life.
For some years a cult figure of postmodern theory, Baudrillard moved beyond the postmodern discourse from the early 1980s to the present, and has developed a highly idiosyncratic mode of philosophical and cultural analysis.
This entry focuses on the development of Baudrillard's unique modes of thought and how he moved from social theory to postmodern theory to a provocative type of philosophical analysis.
In retrospect, Baudrillard can be seen a theorist who has traced in original ways the life of signs and impact of technology on social life, and who has systematically criticized major modes of modern thought, while developing his own philosophical perspectives.
...........................................
Symbolic Exchange and the Postmodern Break :
The Mirror of Production and his next book Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976),
a major text finally translated in 1993,
are attempts to provide ultraradical perspectives that overcome the limitations of an economistic Marxist tradition that privileges the economic sphere.
This ultra-leftist phase of Baudrillard's itinerary would be short-lived, however, though in Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard produces one of his most important and dramatic provocations. The text opens with a Preface that condenses his attempt to provide a significantly different approach to society and culture.
Building on the French cultural theory of Georges Bataille, Marcel Mauss, and Alfred Jarry, Baudrillard champions “symbolic exchange” which resists capitalist values of utility and monetary profit for cultural values.
Baudrillard argues that in Bataille's claim that expenditure and excess is connected with sovereignty, Mauss's descriptions of the social prestige of gift-giving in premodern society, Jarry's theater that ridicules French culture, and Saussure's anagrams, there is a break with the values of capitalist exchange and production, or the production of meaning in linguistic exchange.
These cases of “symbolic exchange,” Baudrillard believes, break with the values of production and describe poetic exchange and creative cultural activity that provides alternatives to the capitalist values of production and exchange.
The term “symbolic exchange” was derived from Georges Bataille's notion of a “general economy” where expenditure, waste, sacrifice, and destruction were claimed to be more fundamental to human life than economies of production and utility (1988 [1967]).
Bataille's model was the sun that freely expended its energy without asking anything in return. He argued that if individuals wanted to be truly sovereign (e.g., free from the imperatives of capitalism) they should pursue a “general economy” of expenditure, giving, sacrifice, and destruction to escape determination by existing imperatives of utility.
For Bataille, human beings were beings of excess with exorbitant energy, fantasies, drives, needs, and heterogeneous desire. At this point, Baudrillard presupposes the truth of Bataille's anthropology and general economy.
In a 1976 review of a volume of Bataille's Complete Works, Baudrillard writes: “The central idea is that the economy which governs our societies results from a misappropriation of the fundamental human principle, which is a solar principle of expenditure” (1987: 57).
In the early 1970s, Baudrillard took over Bataille's anthropological position and what he calls Bataille's “aristocratic critique” of capitalism that he now claims is grounded in the crass notions of utility and savings rather than the more sublime “aristocratic” notion of excess and expenditure.
Bataille and Baudrillard presuppose here a contradiction between human nature and capitalism. They maintain that humans “by nature” gain pleasure from such things as expenditure, waste, festivities, sacrifices, and so on, in which they are sovereign and free to expend the excesses of their energy (and thus to follow their “real nature”). The capitalist imperatives of labor, utility, and savings by implication are “unnatural,” and go against human nature.
Baudrillard argues that the Marxian critique of capitalism, by contrast, merely attacks exchange value while exalting use value and thus utility and instrumental rationality, thereby “seeking a good use of the economy.”
MARXISM
For Baudrillard:Marxism is therefore only a limited petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalization of life toward the ‘good use’ of the social!
Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with his death. One can accuse this perspective of being pre- or post-Marxist. At any rate, Marxism is only the disenchanted horizon of capital — all that precedes or follows it is more radical than it is (1987: 60).
NIETZCHE
This passage is highly revealing and marks Baudrillard's switch to an “aristocratic critique” of political economy deeply influenced by Bataille and Nietzsche.
For Bataille and Baudrillard are presenting a version of Nietzsche's aristocratic “master morality” where “superior” individuals create their own values and their life articulates an excess, overflow, and intensification of creative and erotic energies. For some time, Baudrillard would continue to attack the bourgeoisie, capital, and political economy, but from a perspective which champions “aristocratic” expenditure and sumptuary, aesthetic and symbolic values. The dark side of his switch in theoretical and political allegiances is a valorization of (i.e., a giving or assigning of value to) sacrifice and death that informs Symbolic Exchange and Death (in which sacrifice provides a giving that subverts bourgeois values of utility and self-preservation, an idea that has sinister implications in an era of suicide bombings and terrorism).
PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIETES
On the whole, in his mid-1970s work, Baudrillard was extricating himself from the familiar Marxian universe of production and class struggle into a quite different neo-aristocratic and metaphysical world-view.
Baudrillard seems to assume at this point that pre-capitalist societies were governed by forms of symbolic exchange similar to Bataille's notion of a general economy.
Influenced by Mauss' theory of the gift and countergift, Baudrillard claimed that pre-capitalist societies were governed by laws of symbolic exchange rather than production and utility.
Developing these ideas, Baudrillard sketched a fundamental dividing line in history between symbolic societies — i.e., societies fundamentally organized around premodern exchange — and productivist societies (i.e., societies organized around production and commodity exchange).
He thus rejects the Marxian philosophy of history which posits the primacy of production in all societies and rejects the Marxian concept of socialism, arguing that it does not break radically enough with capitalist productivism, offering itself merely as a more efficient and equitable organization of production rather than as a completely different sort of society with a different values and forms of culture and life.
REVOLUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE
Henceforth, Baudrillard would contrast — in one way or another — his ideal of symbolic exchange to the values of production, utility, and instrumental rationality that govern capitalist (and socialist) societies.
“Symbolic exchange” thus emerges as Baudrillard's “revolutionary” alternative to the values and practices of capitalist society, and stands for a variety of heterogeneous activities in his 1970s writings.
For instance, he writes in the Critique: “The exchange of looks, the present which comes and goes, are like the air people breathe in and out. This is the metabolism of exchange, prodigality, festival — and also of destruction (which returns to non-value what production has erected, valorized). In this domain, value isn't even recognized” (1981: 207).
MIRROR OF PRODUCTION
He also describes his conception of symbolic exchange in The Mirror of Production where he writes: “The symbolic social relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the consumption of the ‘surplus' and deliberate anti-production” (1975: 143). The term therefore refers to symbolic or cultural activities which do not contribute to capitalist production and accumulation and which potentially constitute a “radical negation” of productivist society.
PREMODERN CULTURE
At this stage of his thought, Baudrillard stood in a French tradition of extolling “primitive” or premodern culture over the abstract rationalism and utilitarianism of modern society.
ROUSSEAU
Baudrillard's defense of symbolic exchange over production and instrumental rationality thus stands in the tradition of Rousseau's defense of the “natural savage” over modern man,
Durkheim's posing mechanical solidarities of premodern societies against the abstract individualism and anomie of modern ones, Bataille's valorization of expenditure of premodern societies,
or Mauss' or Levi-Strauss' fascination with the richness of “primitive societies” or “the savage mind.
” After deconstructing the modern master thinkers and his own theoretical fathers (Marx, Freud, Saussure, and his French contemporaries) for missing the richness of symbolic exchange, Baudrillard continues to champion the symbolic and radical forms of thought and writing in a quest that takes him into ever more esoteric and exotic discourse.
MAUSS-SAUSSURE-FREUD
Thus, against the organizing forms of modern thought and society, Baudrillard champions symbolic exchange as an alternative.
Against modern demands to produce value and meaning, Baudrillard calls for their extermination and annihilation, providing as examples,
Mauss's gift-exchange,
Saussure's anagrams, and
Freud's concept of the death drive.
In all of these instances, there is a rupture with the forms of exchange
of goods, meanings, and libidinal energies)
and thus an escape from the forms of production, capitalism, rationality, and meaning.
Baudrillard's paradoxical concept of symbolic exchange can be explained as expression of a desire to liberate himself from modern positions and to seek a revolutionary position outside of modern society.
Against modern values, Baudrillard advocates their annihilation and extermination.
In his mid-1970s work, however, Baudrillard posits another divide in history as radical as the rupture between premodern symbolic societies and modern ones. In the mode of classical social theory, he systematically develops distinctions between premodern societies organized around symbolic exchange, modern societies organized around production, and postmodern societies organized around “simulation” by which he means the cultural modes of representation that “simulate” reality as in television, computer cyberspace, and virtual reality. Baudrillard's distinction between the mode of production and utility that organized modern societies and the mode of simulation that he believes is the organizing form of postmodern societies postulates a rupture between modern and postmodern societies as great as the divide between modern and premodern ones. In theorizing the epochal postmodern rupture with modernity, Baudrillard declares the “end of political economy” and of an era in which production was the organizing form of society. Following Marx, Baudrillard argues that this modern epoch was the era of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, in which workers were exploited by capital and provided a revolutionary force of upheaval. Baudrillard, however, declared the end of political economy and thus the end of the Marxist problematic and of modernity itself:
The end of labor. The end of production. The end of political economy. The end of the signifier/signified dialectic which facilitates the accumulation of knowledge and of meaning, the linear syntagma of cumulative discourse. And at the same time, the end simultaneously of the exchange value/use value dialectic which is the only thing that makes accumulation and social production possible. The end of linear dimension of discourse. The end of the linear dimension of the commodity. The end of the classical era of the sign. The end of the era of production (Baudrillard 1993a: 8).
The discourse of “the end” signifies his announcing a postmodern break or rupture in history. People are now, Baudrillard claims, in a new era of simulation in which social reproduction (information processing, communication, and knowledge industries, and so on) replaces production as the organizing form of society. In this era, labor is no longer a force of production but is itself a “one sign amongst many” (1993a: 10). Labor is not primarily productive in this situation, but is a sign of one's social position, way of life, and mode of servitude. Wages too bear no rational relation to one's work and what one produces but to one's place within the system (1993a: 19ff.). But, crucially, political economy is no longer the foundation, the social determinant, or even a structural “reality” in which other phenomena can be interpreted and explained (31ff.). Instead people live in the “hyperreality” of simulations in which images, spectacles, and the play of signs replace the concepts of production and class conflict as key constituents of contemporary societies.
From now on, capital and political economy disappear from Baudrillard's story, or return in radically new forms. Henceforth, signs and codes proliferate and produce other signs and new sign machines in ever-expanding and spiraling cycles. Technology thus replaces capital in this story and semiurgy (interpreted by Baudrillard as proliferation of images, information, and signs) replaces production. His postmodern turn is thus connected to a form of technological determinism and a rejection of political economy as a useful explanatory principle — a move that many of his critics reject (see Kellner 1989 and the studies in Kellner 1994).
Symbolic Exchange and Death and the succeeding studies in Simulation and Simulacra (1994 [1981]) articulate the principle of a fundamental rupture between modern and postmodern societies and mark Baudrillard's departure from the problematic of modern social theory. For Baudrillard, modern societies are organized around the production and consumption of commodities, while postmodern societies are organized around simulation and the play of images and signs, denoting a situation in which codes, models, and signs are the organizing forms of a new social order where simulation rules.[5] In the society of simulation, identities are constructed by the appropriation of images, and codes and models determine how individuals perceive themselves and relate to other people. Economics, politics, social life, and culture are all governed by the mode of simulation, whereby codes and models determine how goods are consumed and used, politics unfold, culture is produced and consumed, and everyday life is lived.
Baudrillard's postmodern world is also one in which previously important boundaries and distinctions — such as those between social classes, genders, political leanings, and once autonomous realms of society and culture — lose power. If modern societies, for classical social theory, were characterized by differentiation, for Baudrillard, postmodern societies are characterized by dedifferentiation, the “collapse” of (the power of) distinctions, or implosion. In Baudrillard's society of simulation, the realms of economics, politics, culture, sexuality, and the social all implode into each other. In this implosive mix, economics is fundamentally shaped by culture, politics, and other spheres, while art, once a sphere of potential difference and opposition, is absorbed into the economic and political, while sexuality is everywhere. In this situation, differences between individuals and groups implode in a rapidly mutating or changing dissolution of the social and the previous boundaries and structures upon which social theory had once focused.
In addition, his postmodern universe is one of hyperreality in which entertainment, information, and communication technologies provide experiences more intense and involving than the scenes of banal everyday life, as well as the codes and models that structure everyday life. The realm of the hyperreal (e.g., media simulations of reality, Disneyland and amusement parks, malls and consumer fantasylands, TV sports, and other excursions into ideal worlds) is more real than real, whereby the models, images, and codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior. Yet determination itself is aleatory in a non-linear world where it is impossible to chart causal mechanisms in a situation in which individuals are confronted with an overwhelming flux of images, codes, and models, any of which may shape an individual's thought or behavior.
In this postmodern world, individuals flee from the “desert of the real” for the ecstasies of hyperreality and the new realm of computer, media, and technological experience. In this universe, subjectivities are fragmented and lost, and a new terrain of experience appears that for Baudrillard renders previous social theories and politics obsolete and irrelevant. Tracing the vicissitudes of the subject in present-day society, Baudrillard claims that contemporary subjects are no longer afflicted with modern pathologies like hysteria or paranoia. Rather, they exist in “a state of terror which is characteristic of the schizophrenic, an over-proximity of all things, a foul promiscuity of all things which beleaguer and penetrate him, meeting with no resistance, and no halo, no aura, not even the aura of his own body protects him. In spite of himself the schizophrenic is open to everything and lives in the most extreme confusion” (1988: 27). For Baudrillard, the “ecstasy of communication” means that the subject is in close proximity to instantaneous images and information, in an overexposed and transparent world. In this situation, the subject “becomes a pure screen a pure absorption and re-absorption surface of the influent networks” (1988: 27). In other words, an individual in a postmodern world becomes merely an entity influenced by media, technological experience, and the hyperreal.
Thus, Baudrillard's categories of simulation, implosion, and hyperreality combine to create an emergent postmodern condition that requires entirely new modes of theory and politics to chart and respond to the novelties of the contemporary era. His style and writing strategies are also implosive (i.e., working against previously important distinctions), combining material from strikingly different fields, studded with examples from the mass media and popular culture in an innovative mode of postmodern theory that does not respect disciplinary boundaries. His writing attempts to itself simulate the new conditions, capturing its novelties through inventive use of language and theory. Such radical questioning of contemporary theory and the need for new theoretical strategies are thus legitimated for Baudrillard by the large extent of changes in the current era.
For instance, Baudrillard claims that modernity operates with a mode of representation in which ideas represent reality and truth, concepts that are key postulates of modern theory. A postmodern society explodes this epistemology by creating a situation in which subjects lose contact with the real and fragment and dissolve. This situation portends the end of modern theory that operated with a subject-object dialectic in which the subject was supposed to represent and control the object. In the story of modern philosophy, the philosophic subject attempts to discern the nature of reality, to secure grounded knowledge, and to apply this knowledge to control and dominate the object (e.g., nature, other people, ideas, and so on). Baudrillard follows here the poststructuralist critique that thought and discourse could no longer be securely anchored in a priori or privileged structures of “the real.” Reacting against the mode of representation in modern theory, French thought, especially some deconstructionists (Rorty's “strong textualists”), moved into the play of textuality, of discourse, which allegedly referred only to other texts or discourses in which “the real” or an “outside” were banished to the realm of nostalgia.
In a similar fashion, Baudrillard, a “strong simulacrist,” claims that in the media and consumer society, people are caught up in the play of images, spectacles, and simulacra, that have less and less relationship to an outside, to an external “reality,” to such an extent that the very concepts of the social, political, or even “reality” no longer seem to have any meaning. And the narcoticized and mesmerized (some of Baudrillard's metaphors) media-saturated consciousness is in such a state of fascination with image and spectacle that the concept of meaning itself (which depends on stable boundaries, fixed structures, shared consensus) dissolves. In this alarming and novel postmodern situation, the referent, the behind and the outside, along with depth, essence, and reality all disappear, and with their disappearance, the possibility of all potential opposition vanishes as well. As simulations proliferate, they come to refer only to themselves: a carnival of mirrors reflecting images projected from other mirrors onto the omnipresent television and computer screen and the screen of consciousness, which in turn refers the image to its previous storehouse of images also produced by simulatory mirrors. Caught up in the universe of simulations, the “masses” are “bathed in a media massage” without messages or meaning, a mass age where classes disappear, and politics is dead, as are the grand dreams of disalienation, liberation, and revolution.
Baudrillard claims that henceforth the masses seek spectacle and not meaning. They implode into a “silent majority,” signifying “the end of the social” (1983b). Baudrillard implies that social theory loses its very object as meanings, classes, and difference implode into a “black hole” of non-differentiation. Fixed distinctions between social groupings and ideologies implode and concrete face-to-face social relations recede as individuals disappear in worlds of simulation — media, computers, virtual reality itself. Social theory itself thus loses its object, the social, while radical politics loses its subject and agency.
Nonetheless, he claims, at this point in his trajectory (i.e., the late 1970s and early 1980s) that refusal of meaning and participation by the masses is a form of resistance. Hovering between nostalgia and nihilism, Baudrillard at once exterminates modern ideas (e.g., the subject, meaning, truth, reality, society, socialism, and emancipation) and affirms a mode of symbolic exchange which appears to manifest a nostalgic desire to return to premodern cultural forms. This desperate search for a genuinely revolutionary alternative was abandoned, however, by the early 1980s. Henceforth, he develops yet more novel perspectives on the contemporary moment, vacillating between sketching out alternative modes of thought and behavior and renouncing the quest for political and social change.
In a sense, there is a parodic inversion of historical materialism in Baudrillard. In place of Marx's emphasis on political economy and the primacy of the economic, for Baudrillard it is the model, the superstructure, that generates the real in a situation he refers to as the “end of political economy” (1993a). For Baudrillard, sign values predominate over use values and exchange values; the materiality of needs and commodity use-values to serve them disappear in Baudrillard's semiological imaginary, in which signs take precedence over the real and reconstruct human life. Turning the Marxist categories against themselves, masses absorb classes, the subject of praxis is fractured, and objects come to rule human beings. Revolution is absorbed by the object of critique and technological implosion replaces the socialist revolution in producing a rupture in history. For Baudrillard, in contrast to Marx, the catastrophe of modernity and eruption of postmodernity is produced by the unfolding of technological revolution. Consequently, Baudrillard replaces Marx's hard economic and social determinism with its emphasis on the economic dimension, class struggle, and human praxis, with a form of semiological idealism and technological determinism where signs and objects come to dominate the subject.
Baudrillard thus concludes that the “catastrophe has happened,” that the destruction of modernity and modern theory which he noted in the mid-1970s, has been completed by the development of capitalist society itself, that modernity has disappeared and a new social situation has taken its place. Against traditional strategies of rebellion and revolution, Baudrillard begins to champion what he calls “fatal strategies” that push the values of the system to the extreme in the hopes of collapse or reversal, and eventually adopts a style of highly ironic metaphysical discourse that renounces emancipation and the discourse and hopes of progressive social transformation.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
"Nature,Mind and Death" by Curt John Ducasse,1951

..
Philosophy can proceed scientifically from data statements in which terms crucial to philosophical problems are used to theorize concerning the meanings of such terms ;
the terms central to the philosophic enterprise are value-terms.
.
Causation is understandable in terms of a single change -the cause-
prior to another event -the effect- in a specific environment.
.
Sensations are not objects of acts of sensing,
but kinds of sensing,ways of responding sensibly.
.
Mind is a substance capable of receiving impressions,
causing bodily action,and causing events in consciousness.
.
Although life after death,cannot proved,it is possible ;
what could survive is not personality,but individuality.
..
"Zen Buddhism" by Daiser T.Suzuli,1949

..
(Selections by Editor Wiliam Barrett from works published during the years 1949-1955)
.
Zen is a way of life,of seeing and knowing by looking into one's own nature.
.
The truth comes through active meditation,and enlightenment is sudden and intuitive.
.
Zen does not rely on the intellect,the scriptures,or the written word,
but on a direct pointing at the soul of man,
a seeing into one's own nature as making Buddhahood possible.
.
Zen masters make the moment of enlightenment -satori- possible by referring directly to some natural and commonplace matter ;
the immediate recognition of the unity of being follows.
.
The chief characteristics of satori are irrationality,intuitive insight,authoritativeness,affirmation,a sense of the Beyond,an impersonal tone,
a feeling of exaltation,and momentariness.
.
The methods of Zen are paradox,going beyond the opposites,contradiction,affirmation,repetition,exclamation,silence,or direct action
-such as a blow,or pointing-.
..
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
"Experience and Substance" by De Witt Henry Parker,1941

..
Experience,as something concrete and given,is existentially ultimate ;
in the experience of the self we have an illuminating sample of reality.
.
What we regard as physical objects quite different from our sensations are actually constructions integrating sensory data and meaning.
.
The generic concepts of being derive their sense from the given characteristics of experience.
.
Hume's analysis of causation is inadequate for it fails to take into account the critical role of volition in influencing action.
.
Substances cannot be reduced to their characteristics ;
they are relatively independent,have causal efficacy,and endure through change.
.
Space is a manifold of actual and possible relations ;
time is a term for events and their coming into being and ceasing to be ;
the self is best understood as present in the focal self,
and as having come out of the matrix self.
..
Monday, December 7, 2009
"Nature and Mind " by Frederick James E.Woodbridge,1937

..
Pragmatism is important because of his emphasis on contexts and operations ;
the pragmatic method is useful for the clarification of ideas.
.
Despite pragmatism's usefulness as a method of clarification,
it errs in rejecting objects antecedent to knowledge to which an idea must conform if it is to be true.
.
The alternative to a theory of perception which makes ideas the objects of perception is an operational realism,a theory which rejects sensations as myths and which understands perception as a sense operation directed at objects.
.
A cooperative working of naturalism and humanism,
of science and art,
in the natural outcome of a theory in which the antithesis between science and metaphysics is regarded as unfortunate.
..
Friday, December 4, 2009
"The Philosophy of Physical Realism" by Roy Wood Sellars,1932

..
Human beings know external objects by being affected sensibly by them.
.
By means of the organs of sense the brain is stimulated by objects in such a manner that particular sense-events occur.
.
The object is disclosed in the act of perception,
and human knowledge is not mere inference but actual knowledge.
.
Only individual things are real ; there are no universals.
.
Substance is a self-existent continuant which can enter into relations with other self-existents.
.
Consciousness is an emergent feature of a brain-mind process.
.
Values are understandable in terms of the power of things to become important to human beings.
..
"An Idealist view of Life" by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,1932

..
The ideal world,
which alone is real,lies beyond the phenomenal world of appearance,yet dominates it ;
the center of the universe is the transcendent,the Absolute,Brahma.
.
Intuition is the way to an integral apprehension of ultimate reality ;
it is a knowledge by identity which transcends the distinction between subject and object.
.
Scientific certainty is not the only kind of certainty available to men ;
but in considering the mystical revelation as a source of certainty,
one must distinguish between the content of the experience and the interpretation of it,for interpretation is historically conditioned and liable to error.
.
The scientific view of the inorganic world and of life and mind is more compatible with idealism than with naturalism.
..
"Collected Papers" by Charles Sanders Peirce,1931

..
A belief is a habit of action ;
different beliefs give rise to different modes of action.
.
Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects ;
objects are distinguished according to the difference they make practically.
.
True ideas are those to which responsible investigators,
were they to push their inquires for enough,would finally give assent ;
reality is what true ideas represent.
.
Of the four methods of fixing belief
-the method of tenacity,of authority,of a priori judgments,and the method of science-
the scientific is preferable as providing critical tests of procedures.
.
By the conceptions of Firstness,Secondness,and Thirdness,
a metaphysics of cosmic evolution can be developed ;
Firstness is the individual quality of a thing,
Secondness is the relatedness of a thing to something other than itself,and
Thirdness is the tendency to mediate,to contribute to law.
.
1.There is chance in the universe -tychism- ;
2.the universe begins in a chaos of unpersonalized feeling and develops habits or patterns of action -synechism- ;
3.finally,as laws develop,the universe moves toward a condition of perfect rationality and symmetry -agapasm-.
..
Thursday, December 3, 2009
"Process and Reality" by Alfred North Whitehead,1929

..
Only a philosophy of organism can describe a universe in which process,creativity,
and interdependence are disclosed in immediate experience.
.
Philosophy involves generalization from the concrete particulars we know to universals;
it aims at a description of the dynamic process which is reality.
.
A philosophical system should be logically consistent and coherent,
and it should be grounded in immediate experience.
.
The categories of this philosophy of organism are :
a.the category of the ultimate -creativity-,
b.the categories of existence -actual entities,prehensions,nexus,subjective forms,eternal objects,propositions,multiplicities,and contracts-,
c.the categories of explanation -27 in number-,and
d.the categories of obligation -9 in number-.
.
Everything but God is an actual entity occasioned by something ;
but God,although an actual entity,is not an actual occasion.
.
Every events in the creative,
interdependent process is qualified by past,present,and future.
.
Process in reality is a creative advance in which feelings are integrated,
actual occasions grow together toward a final phase of satisfaction,
and God is conditioned by,the reciprocally affects,
events in the temporal world.
..
"Realms of Being" by George Santayana,1927

..
There is no logical escape from skepticism ;
all of our philosophical beliefs are expressions of animal faith in something that makes sense out of experience.
.
Since essences are merely characteristics considered in abstraction from things,
the leap from a consideration of essence to a belief in matter is a leap of animal faith.
.
Truth is that part of the realm of essence which is realized in the material universe.
.
Spirit,or conscious intelligence,
by going beyond the limits of the present in its operations makes possible a life of reason in which action is ordered for the satisfaction of animal impulse.
..
"The Mind and its place in Nature" by Charlie Dunbar Broad,1925

..
Of the three theories advanced to account for differences in material objects
-vitalism,the theory of emergence,and mechanism-
the emergence theory is the most satisfactory :
new wholes are formed in nature the behavior of which could never have been predicted from knowledge of the parts.
.
The mind-body problem
-What are the relations between body and mind ?-
has been made difficult by confusion concerning the meanings of "mind" and "body" ;
but the solution probably is that mind affects body,
and body affects mind.
.
There must be a center of consciousness which is more than a mere ordering of sense data,but this center may be nothing more than a mass of bodily feelings.
.
Memory traces are neither purely mental nor purely physiological ;
they are psychic factors.
..
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
"Space,Time,and Deity" by Samuel Alexander

..
Philosophy attempts to identify the generic and specific features of whatever exists.
.
The ultimate reality is space-time ;
matter is composed of motions which,in turn,
are made up of point-instants.
.
The categories of being are fundamental properties of space-time ;
the major categories are identity,existence,relation,and order.
.
Matter,life,and consciousness are as real as the universal features of reality ;
they are emergent qualities of the space-time reality.
.
Deity is the highest order of being,
the principle of evolution,
the mind of the world.
..
"Our knowledge of external World" by Bertrand Russell,1914

..
The method of logical analysis makes the resolution of philosophical problems possible by defining the limits of scientific philosophy so as to exclude speculative metaphysics.
.
We can account for our knowledge of the external world by realizing,through logical analysis,that the world as we know it is a construction from the data given in sense experience ; an individual's "private world" is the class of all data within his perspective,and a perceived object is the class of all aspects to be found in all the perspectives which include the object.
.
The conception of permanent things can be constructed by reference to appearances if points are defined by reference to enclosure series of spaces,and if time is defined by reference to classes of events simultaneous with each other.
.
Zeno's paradoxes of motion can be resolved by use of the mathematical theory of continuity.
..
"IDEAS : General introduction to Pure Phenomenology" by Edmund Husserl,1913

..
Natural sciences are,by nature,dogmatic ;
the phenomenologist must undertake a critical study of the conditions under which knowledge is possible.
.
To distinguish within experience that which experiences from that which is experienced,one must suspend natural beliefs ; this suspension of belief is made possible by a method of bracketing by which we talk not about trees and selves as items external to experience but of the "trees" and the "perceptions" of experience.
.
Noema,that which is perceived,is dependent upon noesis,the perceiving ;
but noema has the kind of being peculiar to essences.
.
The absolute forms or essences which owe their actuality in consciousness to acts of perceiving are Eideia,eternal possibilities of quality,related to other Eideia by external relations.
..
"The Principle of Individuality and Value" by Bernard Bosanquet,1912

..
An individual is not a mere particular,nor is he a personality finding supreme value in experience ; an individual is a whole organized from mutually supplementing parts.
.
The world process is moving in the direction of greater integration of its parts.
.
The principle of individuality,when viewed in terms of ideas,is the principle of harmony,cooperation,and noncontradiction.
.
Purpose is secondary to individuality ;
to understand the world,
one must understand it not in terms of purpose but on the principle of individuality.
.
Value depends on order and harmony ;
a life acquires value when it contributes to the realization of a larger whole.
.
The Absolute may be an individual in whom all selves are brought together in a single thought.
..
Monday, November 30, 2009
"The Life of Reason" by George Santayana,1905

..
The philosophy of history is an interpretation of man's past in the light of his ideal development.
.
The life of reason,which gives meaning to history,is the unity given to existence by a mind in love with the good.
.
By the use of reason man distinguishes between spirit and nature,
and comes to understand his own wants and how to satisfy them.
.
Instinct which originally showed itself only in animal impulses takes on ideal dimension and leads man into service for society and God.
.
Finally,in art,which is the imposing of form on matter,
but most of all in science,
which puts the claims of reason to the test of fact,
the life of reason reaches its ideal consummation.
..
"Aesthetic' by Benedetto Croce,1901

..
Art is intuition,
and intuition is the expression of impressions.
.
A sense impression or image becomes an expression,or intuition,
when it is clearly known as an image,
and when it is unified by the feeling it represents.
.
The externalization of works of art by fashioning of physical objects which will serve as stimuli in the reproduction of the intuitions represented is not art.
.
Art is not concerned with :
the useful,
the moral,or
the intellectual.
.
The fanciful combining of images is not art.
.
Intuitions are of individuals,not universals.
.
The theoretical activity of the spirit has two forms :
the aesthetic and the logical ;
the practical activity is composed of :
the economic and the moral.
.
The aesthetic values are :
the beautiful and the ugly ;
the logical values are :
the true and the false ;
the economic values are :
the useful and the useless ;
and the moral values are :
the just and the unjust.
..
"The World and the Individual" by Josiah Royce

..
Being can be understood as an absolute system of ideas which embody the fulfillment purposes.
.
All knowledge is of matters of experience.
.
The individual self must be defined in ethical terms by reference to a life plan.
.
As a free individual each person by his will contributes to the world and to God's will.
.
Although no perfection is to be found in the temporal world,
the Eternal Order is perfect.
.
Because we are finite,union with the infinite God is realized.
..
Thursday, November 26, 2009
"Appearance and Reality" by Francis Herbert Bradley,1893

..
The distinction between
primary (sensed) qualities of physical objects and
secondary (structural) qualities
is based on appearance ;
in reality there is no such distinction.
.
Upon analysis it turns out that space,time,objects,and selves are appearances,not realities ; the concepts do not stand up because alleged differences vanish when it is discovered that definitions are circular,empty,or inconsistent.
.
The logical character of reality is that it does not contradict itself ;
the metaphysical character of reality is that it is one ;
and the epistemological character of reality is that it is experience.
.
Reality,or the Absolute,
must be because appearances are the appearances of reality.
.
In judgment,an idea is predicated of a real subject ;
a judgment is true insofar as it predicates harmonious content,
removing inconsistency -but since predicates are ideal,
every truth is but a partial truth,
every error but a partial error.
..
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