To suppose that the mind is a ghost mysteriously embodied in a machine
is to commit the category mistake of confusing the logic of discourse
about bodies and things with the logic of discourse about minds.
To talk of a person's mind is to talk of his ability to perform certain kinds
of tasks ; words such as 'know' and 'believe' are disposition words indicating
that under certain circumstances certain kinds of performance would
be forthcoming.
What are called mental processes are not processes ;
they are dispositions,or ways of acting,not themselves acts.
Pro-nouns,such as 'I',do not function as proper names,but are index words ;
index words function in a variety of ways.
A man's knowledge of himself comes from observing his own behavior.
To imagine is not to look at pictures in the theater of the mind ;
it is to perform any one of a number of various kinds of acts
-such as telling lies,or playing bears-.
