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Showing posts with label Jean Baudrillard 1929–2007. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jean Baudrillard 1929–2007. Show all posts

Monday, November 29, 2010

Jean Baudrillard - Radical Thought

Jean Baudrillard
Radical Thought

"The novel is a work of art not so much because of its inevitable resemblance
with life but because of the insuperable differences that distinguish it from
life."

- Stevenson

And so is thought! Thought is not so much prized for its inevitable convergences
with truth as it is for the insuperable divergences that separate the two.

It is not true that in order to live one has to believe in one's own existence.
There is no necessity to that. No matter what, our consciousness is never the
echo of our own reality, of an existence set in "real time." But rather it is
its echo in "delayed time," the screen of the dispersion of the subject and of
its identity - only in our sleep, our unconscious, and our death are we
identical to ourselves. Consciousness, which is totally different from belief,
is more spontaneously the result of a challenge to reality, the result of
accepting objective illusion rather than objective reality. This challenge is
more vital to our survival and to that of the human species than the belief in
reality and in existence, which always refers to spiritual consolations
pertaining to another world. Our world is such as it is, but that does not make
it more real in any respect. "The most powerful instinct of man is to be in
conflict with truth, and with the real."

The belief in truth is part of the elementary forms of religious life. It is a
weakness of understanding, of common-sense. At the same time, it is the last
stronghold for the supporters of morality, for the apostles of the legality of
the real and the rational, according to whom the reality principle cannot be
questioned. Fortunately, nobody, not even those who teach it, lives according to
this principle, and for a good reason: nobody really believes in the real. Nor
do they believe in the evidence of real life. This would be too sad.

But the good apostles come back and ask: how can you take away the real from
those who already find it hard to live and who, just like you and me, have a
right to claim the real and the rational? The same insidious objection is
proclaimed in the name of the Third World: How can you take away abundance when
some people are starving to death? Or perhaps: How can you take away the class
struggle from all the peoples that never got to enjoy their Bourgeois
revolution? Or again: How can you take away the feminist and egalitarian
aspirations from all the women that have never heard of women's rights? If you
don't like reality, please do not make everybody else disgusted with it! This is
a question of democratic morality: Do not let Billancourt despair![1] You can
never let people despair.

There is a profound disdain behind these charitable intentions. This disdain
first lies in the fact that reality is instituted as a sort of life-saving
insurance, or as a perpetual concession, as if it were the last of human rights
or the first of everyday consumer products. But, above all, by acknowledging
that people place their hope in reality only, and in the visible proof of their
existence, by giving them a realism reminiscent of St. Sulpice, they are
depicted as naive and idiotic. This disdain, let us acknowledge it, is first
imposed on themselves by these defenders of realism, who reduce their own life
to an accumulation of facts and proofs, of causes and effects. After all, a
well-structured resentment always stems from one's own experience.

Say: I am real, this is real, the world is real, and nobody laughs. But say:
this is a simulacrum, you are only a simulacrum, this war is a simulacrum, and
everybody bursts out laughing. With a condescending and yellow laughter, or
perhaps a convulsive one, as if it was a childish joke or an obscene invitation.
Anything which belongs to the order of simulacrum is obscene or forbidden,
similar to that which belongs to sex or death. However, our belief in reality
and evidence is far more obscene. Truth is what should be laughed at. One may
dream of a culture where everyone bursts into laughter when someone says: this
is true, this is real.

All this defines the insoluble relationship between thought and the real. A
certain type of thought is an accomplice of the real. It starts with the
hypothesis that there is a real reference to an idea and that there is a
possible "ideation" of reality. This is no doubt a comforting perspective, one
which is based on meaning and deciphering. This is also a polarity, similar to
that used by ready-made dialectical and philosophical solutions. The other
thought, on the contrary, is ex-centric from the real. It is an "ex-
centering"[2] of the real world and, consequently, it is alien to a dialectic
which always plays on adversarial poles. It is even alien to critical thought
which always refers to an ideal of the real. To some extent, this thought is not
even a denial of the concept of reality. It is an illusion, that is to say a
"game"[3] played with desire (which this thought puts "into play"), just like
metaphor is a "game" played with truth. This radical thought comes neither from
a philosophical doubt nor from a utopian transference[4] (which always supposes
an ideal transformation of the real). Nor does it stem from an ideal
transcendence. It is the "putting into play"[5] of this world, the material and
immanent illusion of this so-called "real" world - it is a non-critical, non-
dialectical thought. So, this thought appears to be coming from somewhere else.
In any case, there is an incompatibility between thought and the real. Between
thought and the real, there is no necessary or natural transition. Not an
"alternation,"[6] not an alternative either: only an "alterity"[7] keeps them
under pressure[8]. Only fracture, distance and alienation safeguard the
singularity of this thought, the singularity of being a singular event, similar
in a sense to the singularity of the world through which it is made into an
event.

Things probably did not always happen this way. One may dream of a happy
conjunction of idea and reality, in the shadow of the Enlightenment and of
modernity, in the heroic ages of critical thought. But that thought, which
operated against a form of illusion - superstitious, religious, or ideological -
is substantially over. And even if that thought had survived its catastrophic
secularization in all the political systems of the 20th century, the ideal and
almost necessary relationship between concept and reality would in any case have
been destroyed today. That thought disappeared under the pressure of a gigantic
simulation, a technical and mental one, under the pressure of a precession of
models to the benefit of an autonomy of the virtual, from now on liberated from
the real, and of a simultaneous autonomy of the real that today functions for
and by itself - motu propio - in a delirious perspective, infinitely self-
referential. Expelled, so to speak, from its own frame, from its own principle,
pushed toward its extraneity, the real has become an extreme phenomenon. So, we
no longer can think of it as real. But we can think of it as "ex-orbitated," as
if it was seen from another world - as an illusion then.

Let's ponder over what could be a stupefying experience: the discovery of
another real world, different from ours. Ours, one day, was discovered. The
objectivity of this world was discovered, just like America was discovered, more
or less at the same period. But what was discovered can never be created again.
That's how reality was discovered, and is still created (or the alternate
version: this is how reality was created, which is still being discovered). Why
wouldn't there be as many real worlds as there are imaginary ones? Why would
there be only one real world? Why such a mode of exception? In reality, the
notion of a real world existing among all other possible worlds is unimaginable.
It is unthinkable, except perhaps as a dangerous superstition. We must stay away
from that, just as critical thought once stayed away (in the name of the real!)
from religious superstition. Thinkers, give it another try!

In any case, the two orders of thought are irreconcilable. They each follow
their own path without blending into one another. At best, they slide on one
another, like tectonic plates, and from time to time their collision or their
subduction creates fault lines inside which reality is engulfed. Fatality is
always at the crossing point of these two lines. Similarly, radical thought is
at the violent crossing point of sense and non-sense, of truth and non-truth, of
the continuation of the world and the continuation of nothingness.

In contrast to the discourse of reality and rationality, which bets on the fact
that there is something (some meaning) rather than nothing, and which, in the
last analysis, wants to be built on the preservative notion of an objective and
decipherable world, radical thought bets on the illusion of the world. This
thought wants to be illusion, restituting non-veracity to the facts, non-
signification to the world, and formulating the reverse hypothesis that there
may be nothing rather than something, tracking down this nothingness which runs
under the apparent continuation of meaning.

The radical prediction is always that of a non-reality of the facts, of an
illusion of the factual. It merely starts with the foreboding of this illusion,
but never fuses with the objective state of things. Any fusion of this type
would be similar to mistaking a messenger for his message, which still today
consists in killing the messenger who always brings the bad news (for example,
the news that all our values are null, that the real is uncertain, that certain
events do not "take place"[9]). Any fusion of the thought (of writing, of
language) with the real - a so-called "faithfulness of the real" with a thought
that has made the real emerge in all of its configurations - is hallucinatory.
It is moreover the result of a total misinterpretation of language, of the fact
that language is an illusion in its very movement, that it carries this
continuation of emptiness or nothingness at the very core of what it says, and
that it is in all its materiality a deconstruction of what it signifies. Just as
the photograph (the image) connotes an erasure, the death of what it represents,
that which gives the photograph its intensity, what gives intensity to writing,
be it the writing of a fiction or the writing of a theoretical fiction, is
emptiness, an underlying nothingness, an illusion of meaning, an ironic
dimension of language, which is corollary to an ironic dimension of the facts
themselves, which are never what they are - in all meanings: they are never more
than what they are, and they are always only what they are - a perfect
amphiboly. The irony of the facts, in their miserable reality, is precisely that
they are only what they are. At least, that is what they are supposed to mean:
"the real is the real." But, by this very fact (so to speak), they are
necessarily beyond [truth] because factual existence is impossible: nothing is
totally evidentiary without becoming an enigma. Reality, in general, is too
evident to be true.

It is this ironic transfiguration through language which constitutes the event
of language. And it is on a restitution of this fundamental illusion of the
world and language that thought must work, without however taking language in
its literality, where the messenger is mistaken for the message, and thus
already sacrificed.

The two modes of thought present radically opposed projects: one hopes to reveal
the objective reality of this world but wants to be a distinct thought; the
other seeks to restore an illusion, of which it is an integral part. One seeks a
total gravitation, a concentric effect of meaning. The other seeks to be anti-
gravitational and to reach an "ex-centering" of reality, a global attraction of
the void toward the periphery (Jarry).

The requirement of this thought is double and contradictory. It does not consist
in analyzing the world to extract from it an improbable truth. It does not adapt
itself dialectically to the facts and abstract from them some logical
construction. It is much more subtle than that, and more perverse as well. This
thought consists in putting into place a form, a matrix of illusion and
disillusion, a strange attracting force, so that a seduced reality will be able
to spontaneously feed on it. This thought will also be implacably self-
fulfilling (you just have, from time to time, to displace the "object"[10] a
bit). Indeed, reality only asks to be submitted to hypotheses, so that it can
fulfill[11] all of them: this is reality's own trick and vengeance. A
theoretical ideal would be to put into place some theses so that they could be
denied by reality and so that reality would have no choice but to oppose them
violently and thus unmask them. For reality is an illusion, and any thought must
first try to unmask it. For this purpose, reality itself must remain masked and
must shape itself as a decoy, without even thinking or caring about its own
truth. Reality must place its pride in never being an instrument of analysis, or
a critical instrument, because it is the world that must proceed to its own
analysis. It is the world, not reality, that must be revealed not as a truth,
but as an illusion.

We must trap reality, we must go faster than reality. The idea too must go
faster than its own shadow. But if the idea goes too fast, even its shadow
faints: no longer having the faintest idea...[12] Words go faster than
signification. But if they go too fast, everything turns into sheer madness: an
ellipse of meaning may even cause one to lose one's taste for the sign. What can
we exchange this work, this shadow, this intellectual economy and patience for?
What can we sell it to the devil for? It is hard to tell. In fact, we are the
orphans of a reality that came too late and which is only, like truth, an
"official report" in "delayed time."

The ultimate prize[13] is when an idea disappears as an idea to become a thing
among other things. That's where it finds its completion. Having become con-
substantial with the surrounding world, the idea no longer has to appear as an
idea and no longer has to be supported as such. A vanishing of the idea through
a silent dissemination, and of course an antinomy of any intellectual
celebration. An idea is never destined to burst open but on the contrary to fade
away in the world, in the trans-appearance the idea gives to the world, and in
the trans-appearance of the world as it was expressed by the idea. A book is
finished only when its object has vanished. Its substance must not leave any
marks. It is as if it were a perfect crime. Whatever its object, writing must
allow illusion to radiate and turn it into an elusive enigma: unable to be
received by the specialists and the Realpolitikers of the concept. The objective
of writing is to alter its object, to seduce it, to make it disappear from its
own vision. Writing aims at a total resolution, a poetic resolution as Saussure
would have it, a resolution marked by a rigorous dispersion in the name of God.

If the thought enunciates an object as a truth, it is only as a challenge to
this object's own self-fulfillment. The trouble[14] with reality (reality's
ennui) is that it goes head-on toward the hypotheses that negate it. And then
reality surrenders to the first warnings, and bends to conceptual violence. Its
distinguishing sign is that of voluntary serfdom. Reality's a bitch![15]
Contrary to what is said (the real is what resists, that on which all hypotheses
come to crash), reality is not very strong, or at least less and less so.
Rather, reality appears to be ready to operate a disorderly withdrawal. Full
walls of reality crumble - just like the collapse of Buzatti's "Baliverna,"
where the smallest crack triggers a total chain reaction. We can find the
decomposed ruins everywhere - just as in Borges' "Map and Territory." Not only
does reality resist those who still criticize it, but it also abandons those who
defend it. Maybe it is a way for reality to get its revenge from those who claim
to believe in it for the sole purpose of eventually transforming it: sending
back its supporters to their own desires. Finally, reality is perhaps more like
a "femme fatale" than a "bitch."[16]

More subtly, reality also gets its revenge from those who challenge it by,
paradoxically, proving that they are right. Whenever any risky idea, any cynical
or critical hypothesis proves to be right, it in fact turns out to be a dirty
trick. You are fooled and disarmed. Your arguments are lamentably confirmed by a
reality without scruples.

So, you may posit the idea of a simulacrum, and yet, secretly, not believe in
it, hoping that the real will avenge itself. The theory is then not necessarily
convinced of its own validity. Unfortunately, only those who are reality
fanatics react negatively. Reality does not seem to be willing to deny itself,
far from it: all simulacra wander freely. Reality today is nothing more than the
apocalypse of simulation. Consequently, the reality supporters (who defend
reality as if it was a moral value or a virtue) play, so to speak, the part of
those who once were called the fanatics of the Apocalypse.

The idea of simulacrum was a conceptual weapon against reality, but it has been
stolen. Not that it has been pillaged, vulgarized, or has become common-
place[17] (which is true but has no consequence), but because simulacra have
been absorbed by reality which has swallowed them and which, from now on, is
clad with all the rhetoric of simulation. And to cap it all, simulacra have
become reality! Today, simulacra guarantee the continuation of the real. The
simulacrum now hides, not the truth, but the fact that there is none, that is to
say, the continuation of Nothingness.

This is the very paradox of any thought that reveals the falsehood of the real:
when reality steals your concept and realizes (fulfills) it, and by the same
token flies away from any criticism. Events, deprived of any direction, steal
any possible meaning.[18] They adapt to the most fantastic hypotheses like
natural species and viruses adapt to the most hostile environments. They show an
extraordinary mimetic capacity. There has been a reversal here too: it is no
longer theories that have to adapt to events, but events that adapt to theories.
In any case, they mystify us because a theory that realizes itself[19] is no
longer a theory. A realized hypothesis is no longer a hypothesis. It is
terrifying to see a hypothesis be realized like this. It is terrifying to
suddenly see the idea coincide with reality. This is the agony of the concept.
The epiphany of the real is the twilight of the concept.

We have lost the advance that ideas had on the world, that distance that makes
an idea stay an idea. Thought must anticipate, be exceptional, and in the margin
- the projected shadow of the future events. Yet, today, we are lagging behind
the events. They may sometimes give the impression that they regress, that they
are not what they should be. In fact, they have passed over us for a long time.
The simulated disorder of things has gone faster than us. The effect of reality
has disappeared behind the acceleration of things - an anamorphosis of speed.
What happens to the heterogeneity of thought in a world that has been converted
to the craziest hypotheses and to an artificial delirium? In their accelerated
occurrence, the events have in a sense swallowed their own interpretation.
Things have been cleansed of their own meaning. And consequently, they are like
black holes and can no longer reflect. They are what they are, never too late
for their occurrence, but always beyond their meaning. What is late rather is
the interpretation of things. Interpretation is then merely a retro figure for
an unpredictable event.

What to do then? What is there to do when suddenly everything fits the ironic,
critical, alternative, and catastrophic model that you suggested (everything
fits the model you gave beyond any hopes you had because, in a sense, you never
believed it could go that far, otherwise you would never have been able to
create it)? Well!... It's heaven! We are beyond doomsday, in the realm of
immortality. All there is to do is survive. For, then, at this point, the irony,
the challenge, the anticipation, and the evil are terminated, just as hope
inexorably dies in front of the gates of hell. In fact, hell starts here. Hell
as an inferno characterized by the unconditional realization of all ideas: an
inferno of reality. We then understand (see Adorno) that concepts prefer to
commit suicide rather than come to that point.

Something else has been stolen from us: indifference. The power of indifference,
which is the quality of the mind, as opposed to the play of differences, which
is the characteristic of the world. But indifference has been taken away from us
by a world that has become indifferent. Similarly, the eccentricity of thinking
has been taken away by an eccentric world. When things and events refer to one
another and to their non-differentiated concept, the equivalence of the world
joins and erases the indifference of thinking. Boredom emerges. No more
confrontations, no more stakes. Just a parting of dead waters.

How beautiful indifference was in a world that was not indifferent! In a world
that was different, convulsive and contradictory, with stakes and passions. Back
then, the indifference of the mind could turn into a stake or a passion, in
total opposition to the world. It could anticipate the indifferent future of the
world and turn this indifference into an event. Today, it is difficult to be
more apathetic and more indifferent than the facts themselves. The world in
which we operate today is apathetic, indifferent to its own life, without
passion, and deadly boring. There is no point in being dispassionate in a world
without passions. Being dis-invested in a world without investment makes no
sense. That's how we have become orphans.

Our point is not to defend radical thought. Any idea that can be defended is
presumed guilty. Any idea that does not sustain its own defense deserves to
perish. But we have to fight against charges of unreality, lack of
responsibility, nihilism, and despair. Radical thought is never depressing. This
would be a complete misunderstanding. A moralizing and ideological critique,
obsessed by meaning and content, obsessed by a political finality of discourse,
never takes into account writing, the act of writing, the poetic, ironic, and
allusive form of language, the play with meaning. This critique does not see
that the resolution of meaning is right here, in the form itself, in the formal
materiality of an expression. As for meaning, it is always unfortunate. Analysis
is by its very definition unfortunate since it is born out of a critical
disillusion. But language on the contrary is fortunate (happy), even when it
designates a world with no illusion, with no hope. This would in fact be here
the very definition of radical thought: an intelligence without hope, but a
fortunate and happy form. Critics, always being unfortunate (unhappy) in their
nature, choose the realm of ideas as their battle field. They do not see that if
discourse always tends to produce meaning, language and writing on the contrary
are always a matter of illusion. Language and writing are the living illusion of
meaning, the resolution of the misfortune of meaning operated through the good
fortune of language. This is the only political or transpolitical act that a
writer can accomplish.

Everyone has ideas, even more than they need. What matters is the poetic
singularity of analysis. Only this witz, this spirituality of language, can
justify writing. Not a miserable critical objectivity of ideas. There will never
be a solution to the contradiction of ideas, except inside language itself, in
the energy and fortune (happiness) of language. So the loneliness and sadness in
Edward Hopper's paintings are transfigured by the timeless quality of light, a
light which comes from some place else and gives to the whole picture a totally
non-figurative meaning, an intensity which renders loneliness unreal. Hopper
says: "I do not paint sadness or loneliness; I only seek to paint light on this
wall."

In any case, it is better to have a despairing analysis in a happy language than
an optimistic analysis in despairingly boring and demoralizingly plain language.
Which is too often the case. The formal boredom that is secreted by an idealist
thought on values, or by a goal-oriented[20] thought on culture, is the secret
sign of despair for this thought - not despair with the world, but despair
toward its own discourse. This is where the real depressing thought emerges. It
emerges with those people who only talk about a transcendence[21] or a
transformation of the world, while they are totally unable to transfigure their
own language.

Radical thought is in no way different from radical usage of language. This
thought is therefore alien to any resolution of the world which would take the
direction[22] of an objective reality and of its deciphering. Radical thought
does not decipher. It anathematizes and "anagramatizes" concepts and ideas,
exactly what poetic language does with words. Through its reversible chaining,
it simultaneously gives an account of meaning and of its fundamental illusion.
Language gives an account of the very illusion of language as a definite[23]
stratagem and through that notes the illusion of the world as an infinite trap,
as a seduction of the mind, as a stealing away of all mental capacities. While
being a transporter of meaning, language is at the same time a supra-conductor
of illusion and of the absence of meaning[24]. Language is only signification's
unintentional accomplice. By its very force, it calls for the spiritual
imagination of sounds and rhythms, for the dispersion of meaning in the event of
language, similar to the role of the muscles in dance, similar to the role of
reproduction in erotic games.

Such a passion for the artificial, a passion for illusion, is the same thing as
the seductive joy (jouissance[25]) to undo a too perfect constellation of
meaning. It is also a joy (jouissance) to render transparent the imposture of
the world, that is to say the enigmatic function of the world, and its
mystification which supposedly is its secret. Doing this while perhaps rendering
its imposture transparent: deceiving rather than validating meaning.[26] This
passion "wins"[27] in the free and spiritual usage of language, in the spiritual
game of writing. And it only disappears when language is used for a limited
finality, its most common usage perhaps, that of communication. No matter what,
if language wants to "speak the language" of illusion, it must become a
seduction. As for "speaking the language" of the real, it would not know how to
do it (properly speaking) because language is never real. Whenever it appears to
be able to designate things, it actually does so by following unreal, elliptic,
and ironic paths. Objectivity and truth are metaphoric in language. Too bad for
the apodicticians or the apodidacticians! This is how language is, even
unconsciously, the carrier of radical thought, because it always starts from
itself, as a trait d'esprit vis-a-vis the world, as an ellipse and a source of
pleasure. Even the confusion of languages in the Tower of Babel, a powerful
mechanism of illusion for the human race, a source of non-communication and an
end to the possibility of a universal language, will have appeared, finally, not
as a divine punishment but as a gift from God.

Ciphering, not deciphering. Operating illusions. Being illusion[28] to be event.
Turning into an enigma what is clear. Making unintelligible what is far too
intelligible. Rendering unreadable the event itself. Working all the events to
make them unintelligible. Accentuating the fake transparency of the world to
spread a terroristic confusion, to spread the germs or viruses of a radical
illusion, that is to say operating a radical disillusion of the real. A viral
and deleterious thought, which corrupts meaning, and is the accomplice of an
erotic perception of reality's trouble.

Erasing in oneself any remaining trace of the intellectual plot. Stealing the
"reality file" to erase its conclusions. But, in fact, it is reality itself
which foments its own contradiction, its own denial, its own loss through our
lack of reality. Hence, the internal feeling that all this affair - the world,
thought, and language - has emerged from some place else and could disappear as
if by magic. The world does not seek to have more existence, nor does it seek to
persist in its existence. On the contrary, it is looking for the most spiritual
way to escape reality. Through thought, the world is looking for what could lead
to its own loss.

The absolute rule, that of symbolic exchange, is to return what you received.
Never less, but always more. The absolute rule of thought is to return the world
as we received it: unintelligible. And if it is possible, to return it a little
bit more unintelligible. A little bit more enigmatic.



Notes

[1] "Billancourt," a French automobile production plant renowned for its
repeated strikes, is here Baudrillard's metaphor for the "proletariat".

[2] Excentration is the term used in French.

[3] The term used in French is jeu. Jeu means either game, play or mechanism.

[4] Transfert utopique is the term used in French.

[5] The term mise en jeu (putting into play) renders the idea of play/game. But
it may also signify the beginning of a process, game, activity (for example, the
biginning of a soccer game or a card game). It may also connote that which is at
stake (en jeu).

[6] Alternance in French.

[7] "Alterity," of alterite in French, reiterates the notion of "radical
otherness" already expressed by Jean Baudrillard in another work. See Marc
Guillaume & Jean Baudrillard, L'Alterite Radicale (Paris: Gallimard, 1994),
still not published in English.

[8] Sous Tension in French.

[9] Ont lieu in French means either "taking place" (in the sense of happening)
or "taking its place" (in the sense of ocupying a place, a specific locus).

[10] The term used by Baudrillard is objectif which means either objective,
goal/aim or lens (as in a photographic device). To leave the term objectif
undecided in this translation the word "object", unsatisfactory as it is, seemed
appropriate.

[11] The term used in French is verifier: to fulfill, to check or to prove.

[12] The pun is better rendered in French. "Shadow" (ombre in French) appears in
the common saying: ne plus avoir l'ombre d'une idee, no longer haveing the
slightest idea about anything, but literally meaning "no longer having the
shadow of an idea."

[13] Le fin du fin signifies that which is highest among the already high, the
top of the top. Yet the term fin also means the end (so, "the end of the end"
perhaps too...).

[14] Ennui means trouble but also conveys the notion of "boredom".

[15] La realite est une chienne in French.

[16] A very shaky translation of: "la realite est peut-etre plutot une sphinge
qu'une chienne."

[17] The term used in French, lieu commun, gives the idea of place (literally, a
common place), but also signifies "banality".

[18] Baudrillard here plays on the term sens which, in French, means "direction"
or "meaning" (it can also mean "sense"). Teh terms "direction" and "meaning" are
interchangable in this sentence and can be conbined any way the reader prefers.

[19] Or "fulfills itself."

[20] Voluntariste in French.

[21] Depassement.

[22] or the meaning.

[23] definitif.

[24] non-sens

[25] joie

[26] imposteur, et non composteur de sens.

[27] L'emporte in French means either "winning" or "carrying away with oneself."
La passion l'emporte can thus signify the success of this passion over meaning
or the fact that this passion has grabbed meaning and takes it away with itself.


[28] Faire illusion is also a French expression which means "conveying
unfulfilled hopes or promises,"


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Tuesday, December 22, 2009

"The Mirror of Production" and "Symbolic Exchange and Death" by Jean Baudrillard,1976,

French theorist Jean Baudrillard was one of the foremost intellectual figures of the present age whose work combines philosophy, social theory, and an idiosyncratic cultural metaphysics that reflects on key events of phenomena of the epoch.

A sharp critic of contemporary society, culture, and thought, Baudrillard is often seen as a major guru of French postmodern theory, although he can also be read as a thinker who combines social theory and philosophy in original and provocative ways and a writer who has developed his own style and forms of writing.

He was an extremely prolific author who has published over thirty books and commented on some of the most salient cultural and sociological phenomena of the contemporary era, including the erasure of the distinctions of gender, race, and class that structured modern societies in a new postmodern consumer, media, and high tech society; the mutating roles of art and aesthetics; fundamental changes in politics, culture, and human beings; and the impact of new media, information, and cybernetic technologies in the creation of a qualitatively different social order, providing fundamental mutations of human and social life.

For some years a cult figure of postmodern theory, Baudrillard moved beyond the postmodern discourse from the early 1980s to the present, and has developed a highly idiosyncratic mode of philosophical and cultural analysis.

This entry focuses on the development of Baudrillard's unique modes of thought and how he moved from social theory to postmodern theory to a provocative type of philosophical analysis.

In retrospect, Baudrillard can be seen a theorist who has traced in original ways the life of signs and impact of technology on social life, and who has systematically criticized major modes of modern thought, while developing his own philosophical perspectives.
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Symbolic Exchange and the Postmodern Break :

The Mirror of Production and his next book Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976),
a major text finally translated in 1993,
are attempts to provide ultraradical perspectives that overcome the limitations of an economistic Marxist tradition that privileges the economic sphere.

This ultra-leftist phase of Baudrillard's itinerary would be short-lived, however, though in Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard produces one of his most important and dramatic provocations. The text opens with a Preface that condenses his attempt to provide a significantly different approach to society and culture.

Building on the French cultural theory of Georges Bataille, Marcel Mauss, and Alfred Jarry, Baudrillard champions “symbolic exchange” which resists capitalist values of utility and monetary profit for cultural values.

Baudrillard argues that in Bataille's claim that expenditure and excess is connected with sovereignty, Mauss's descriptions of the social prestige of gift-giving in premodern society, Jarry's theater that ridicules French culture, and Saussure's anagrams, there is a break with the values of capitalist exchange and production, or the production of meaning in linguistic exchange.

These cases of “symbolic exchange,” Baudrillard believes, break with the values of production and describe poetic exchange and creative cultural activity that provides alternatives to the capitalist values of production and exchange.

The term “symbolic exchange” was derived from Georges Bataille's notion of a “general economy” where expenditure, waste, sacrifice, and destruction were claimed to be more fundamental to human life than economies of production and utility (1988 [1967]).

Bataille's model was the sun that freely expended its energy without asking anything in return. He argued that if individuals wanted to be truly sovereign (e.g., free from the imperatives of capitalism) they should pursue a “general economy” of expenditure, giving, sacrifice, and destruction to escape determination by existing imperatives of utility.

For Bataille, human beings were beings of excess with exorbitant energy, fantasies, drives, needs, and heterogeneous desire. At this point, Baudrillard presupposes the truth of Bataille's anthropology and general economy.

In a 1976 review of a volume of Bataille's Complete Works, Baudrillard writes: “The central idea is that the economy which governs our societies results from a misappropriation of the fundamental human principle, which is a solar principle of expenditure” (1987: 57).

In the early 1970s, Baudrillard took over Bataille's anthropological position and what he calls Bataille's “aristocratic critique” of capitalism that he now claims is grounded in the crass notions of utility and savings rather than the more sublime “aristocratic” notion of excess and expenditure.

Bataille and Baudrillard presuppose here a contradiction between human nature and capitalism. They maintain that humans “by nature” gain pleasure from such things as expenditure, waste, festivities, sacrifices, and so on, in which they are sovereign and free to expend the excesses of their energy (and thus to follow their “real nature”). The capitalist imperatives of labor, utility, and savings by implication are “unnatural,” and go against human nature.

Baudrillard argues that the Marxian critique of capitalism, by contrast, merely attacks exchange value while exalting use value and thus utility and instrumental rationality, thereby “seeking a good use of the economy.”

MARXISM
For Baudrillard:Marxism is therefore only a limited petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalization of life toward the ‘good use’ of the social!

Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with his death. One can accuse this perspective of being pre- or post-Marxist. At any rate, Marxism is only the disenchanted horizon of capital — all that precedes or follows it is more radical than it is (1987: 60).

NIETZCHE
This passage is highly revealing and marks Baudrillard's switch to an “aristocratic critique” of political economy deeply influenced by Bataille and Nietzsche.

For Bataille and Baudrillard are presenting a version of Nietzsche's aristocratic “master morality” where “superior” individuals create their own values and their life articulates an excess, overflow, and intensification of creative and erotic energies. For some time, Baudrillard would continue to attack the bourgeoisie, capital, and political economy, but from a perspective which champions “aristocratic” expenditure and sumptuary, aesthetic and symbolic values. The dark side of his switch in theoretical and political allegiances is a valorization of (i.e., a giving or assigning of value to) sacrifice and death that informs Symbolic Exchange and Death (in which sacrifice provides a giving that subverts bourgeois values of utility and self-preservation, an idea that has sinister implications in an era of suicide bombings and terrorism).

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIETES
On the whole, in his mid-1970s work, Baudrillard was extricating himself from the familiar Marxian universe of production and class struggle into a quite different neo-aristocratic and metaphysical world-view.

Baudrillard seems to assume at this point that pre-capitalist societies were governed by forms of symbolic exchange similar to Bataille's notion of a general economy.
Influenced by Mauss' theory of the gift and countergift, Baudrillard claimed that pre-capitalist societies were governed by laws of symbolic exchange rather than production and utility.
Developing these ideas, Baudrillard sketched a fundamental dividing line in history between symbolic societies — i.e., societies fundamentally organized around premodern exchange — and productivist societies (i.e., societies organized around production and commodity exchange).
He thus rejects the Marxian philosophy of history which posits the primacy of production in all societies and rejects the Marxian concept of socialism, arguing that it does not break radically enough with capitalist productivism, offering itself merely as a more efficient and equitable organization of production rather than as a completely different sort of society with a different values and forms of culture and life.

REVOLUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE
Henceforth, Baudrillard would contrast — in one way or another — his ideal of symbolic exchange to the values of production, utility, and instrumental rationality that govern capitalist (and socialist) societies.
“Symbolic exchange” thus emerges as Baudrillard's “revolutionary” alternative to the values and practices of capitalist society, and stands for a variety of heterogeneous activities in his 1970s writings.
For instance, he writes in the Critique: “The exchange of looks, the present which comes and goes, are like the air people breathe in and out. This is the metabolism of exchange, prodigality, festival — and also of destruction (which returns to non-value what production has erected, valorized). In this domain, value isn't even recognized” (1981: 207).

MIRROR OF PRODUCTION
He also describes his conception of symbolic exchange in The Mirror of Production where he writes: “The symbolic social relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the consumption of the ‘surplus' and deliberate anti-production” (1975: 143). The term therefore refers to symbolic or cultural activities which do not contribute to capitalist production and accumulation and which potentially constitute a “radical negation” of productivist society.

PREMODERN CULTURE
At this stage of his thought, Baudrillard stood in a French tradition of extolling “primitive” or premodern culture over the abstract rationalism and utilitarianism of modern society.

ROUSSEAU
Baudrillard's defense of symbolic exchange over production and instrumental rationality thus stands in the tradition of Rousseau's defense of the “natural savage” over modern man,
Durkheim's posing mechanical solidarities of premodern societies against the abstract individualism and anomie of modern ones, Bataille's valorization of expenditure of premodern societies,
or Mauss' or Levi-Strauss' fascination with the richness of “primitive societies” or “the savage mind.

” After deconstructing the modern master thinkers and his own theoretical fathers (Marx, Freud, Saussure, and his French contemporaries) for missing the richness of symbolic exchange, Baudrillard continues to champion the symbolic and radical forms of thought and writing in a quest that takes him into ever more esoteric and exotic discourse.

MAUSS-SAUSSURE-FREUD
Thus, against the organizing forms of modern thought and society, Baudrillard champions symbolic exchange as an alternative.
Against modern demands to produce value and meaning, Baudrillard calls for their extermination and annihilation, providing as examples,
Mauss's gift-exchange,
Saussure's anagrams, and
Freud's concept of the death drive.

In all of these instances, there is a rupture with the forms of exchange
of goods, meanings, and libidinal energies)
and thus an escape from the forms of production, capitalism, rationality, and meaning.

Baudrillard's paradoxical concept of symbolic exchange can be explained as expression of a desire to liberate himself from modern positions and to seek a revolutionary position outside of modern society.
Against modern values, Baudrillard advocates their annihilation and extermination.

In his mid-1970s work, however, Baudrillard posits another divide in history as radical as the rupture between premodern symbolic societies and modern ones. In the mode of classical social theory, he systematically develops distinctions between premodern societies organized around symbolic exchange, modern societies organized around production, and postmodern societies organized around “simulation” by which he means the cultural modes of representation that “simulate” reality as in television, computer cyberspace, and virtual reality. Baudrillard's distinction between the mode of production and utility that organized modern societies and the mode of simulation that he believes is the organizing form of postmodern societies postulates a rupture between modern and postmodern societies as great as the divide between modern and premodern ones. In theorizing the epochal postmodern rupture with modernity, Baudrillard declares the “end of political economy” and of an era in which production was the organizing form of society. Following Marx, Baudrillard argues that this modern epoch was the era of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, in which workers were exploited by capital and provided a revolutionary force of upheaval. Baudrillard, however, declared the end of political economy and thus the end of the Marxist problematic and of modernity itself:

The end of labor. The end of production. The end of political economy. The end of the signifier/signified dialectic which facilitates the accumulation of knowledge and of meaning, the linear syntagma of cumulative discourse. And at the same time, the end simultaneously of the exchange value/use value dialectic which is the only thing that makes accumulation and social production possible. The end of linear dimension of discourse. The end of the linear dimension of the commodity. The end of the classical era of the sign. The end of the era of production (Baudrillard 1993a: 8).
The discourse of “the end” signifies his announcing a postmodern break or rupture in history. People are now, Baudrillard claims, in a new era of simulation in which social reproduction (information processing, communication, and knowledge industries, and so on) replaces production as the organizing form of society. In this era, labor is no longer a force of production but is itself a “one sign amongst many” (1993a: 10). Labor is not primarily productive in this situation, but is a sign of one's social position, way of life, and mode of servitude. Wages too bear no rational relation to one's work and what one produces but to one's place within the system (1993a: 19ff.). But, crucially, political economy is no longer the foundation, the social determinant, or even a structural “reality” in which other phenomena can be interpreted and explained (31ff.). Instead people live in the “hyperreality” of simulations in which images, spectacles, and the play of signs replace the concepts of production and class conflict as key constituents of contemporary societies.

From now on, capital and political economy disappear from Baudrillard's story, or return in radically new forms. Henceforth, signs and codes proliferate and produce other signs and new sign machines in ever-expanding and spiraling cycles. Technology thus replaces capital in this story and semiurgy (interpreted by Baudrillard as proliferation of images, information, and signs) replaces production. His postmodern turn is thus connected to a form of technological determinism and a rejection of political economy as a useful explanatory principle — a move that many of his critics reject (see Kellner 1989 and the studies in Kellner 1994).

Symbolic Exchange and Death and the succeeding studies in Simulation and Simulacra (1994 [1981]) articulate the principle of a fundamental rupture between modern and postmodern societies and mark Baudrillard's departure from the problematic of modern social theory. For Baudrillard, modern societies are organized around the production and consumption of commodities, while postmodern societies are organized around simulation and the play of images and signs, denoting a situation in which codes, models, and signs are the organizing forms of a new social order where simulation rules.[5] In the society of simulation, identities are constructed by the appropriation of images, and codes and models determine how individuals perceive themselves and relate to other people. Economics, politics, social life, and culture are all governed by the mode of simulation, whereby codes and models determine how goods are consumed and used, politics unfold, culture is produced and consumed, and everyday life is lived.

Baudrillard's postmodern world is also one in which previously important boundaries and distinctions — such as those between social classes, genders, political leanings, and once autonomous realms of society and culture — lose power. If modern societies, for classical social theory, were characterized by differentiation, for Baudrillard, postmodern societies are characterized by dedifferentiation, the “collapse” of (the power of) distinctions, or implosion. In Baudrillard's society of simulation, the realms of economics, politics, culture, sexuality, and the social all implode into each other. In this implosive mix, economics is fundamentally shaped by culture, politics, and other spheres, while art, once a sphere of potential difference and opposition, is absorbed into the economic and political, while sexuality is everywhere. In this situation, differences between individuals and groups implode in a rapidly mutating or changing dissolution of the social and the previous boundaries and structures upon which social theory had once focused.

In addition, his postmodern universe is one of hyperreality in which entertainment, information, and communication technologies provide experiences more intense and involving than the scenes of banal everyday life, as well as the codes and models that structure everyday life. The realm of the hyperreal (e.g., media simulations of reality, Disneyland and amusement parks, malls and consumer fantasylands, TV sports, and other excursions into ideal worlds) is more real than real, whereby the models, images, and codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior. Yet determination itself is aleatory in a non-linear world where it is impossible to chart causal mechanisms in a situation in which individuals are confronted with an overwhelming flux of images, codes, and models, any of which may shape an individual's thought or behavior.

In this postmodern world, individuals flee from the “desert of the real” for the ecstasies of hyperreality and the new realm of computer, media, and technological experience. In this universe, subjectivities are fragmented and lost, and a new terrain of experience appears that for Baudrillard renders previous social theories and politics obsolete and irrelevant. Tracing the vicissitudes of the subject in present-day society, Baudrillard claims that contemporary subjects are no longer afflicted with modern pathologies like hysteria or paranoia. Rather, they exist in “a state of terror which is characteristic of the schizophrenic, an over-proximity of all things, a foul promiscuity of all things which beleaguer and penetrate him, meeting with no resistance, and no halo, no aura, not even the aura of his own body protects him. In spite of himself the schizophrenic is open to everything and lives in the most extreme confusion” (1988: 27). For Baudrillard, the “ecstasy of communication” means that the subject is in close proximity to instantaneous images and information, in an overexposed and transparent world. In this situation, the subject “becomes a pure screen a pure absorption and re-absorption surface of the influent networks” (1988: 27). In other words, an individual in a postmodern world becomes merely an entity influenced by media, technological experience, and the hyperreal.

Thus, Baudrillard's categories of simulation, implosion, and hyperreality combine to create an emergent postmodern condition that requires entirely new modes of theory and politics to chart and respond to the novelties of the contemporary era. His style and writing strategies are also implosive (i.e., working against previously important distinctions), combining material from strikingly different fields, studded with examples from the mass media and popular culture in an innovative mode of postmodern theory that does not respect disciplinary boundaries. His writing attempts to itself simulate the new conditions, capturing its novelties through inventive use of language and theory. Such radical questioning of contemporary theory and the need for new theoretical strategies are thus legitimated for Baudrillard by the large extent of changes in the current era.

For instance, Baudrillard claims that modernity operates with a mode of representation in which ideas represent reality and truth, concepts that are key postulates of modern theory. A postmodern society explodes this epistemology by creating a situation in which subjects lose contact with the real and fragment and dissolve. This situation portends the end of modern theory that operated with a subject-object dialectic in which the subject was supposed to represent and control the object. In the story of modern philosophy, the philosophic subject attempts to discern the nature of reality, to secure grounded knowledge, and to apply this knowledge to control and dominate the object (e.g., nature, other people, ideas, and so on). Baudrillard follows here the poststructuralist critique that thought and discourse could no longer be securely anchored in a priori or privileged structures of “the real.” Reacting against the mode of representation in modern theory, French thought, especially some deconstructionists (Rorty's “strong textualists”), moved into the play of textuality, of discourse, which allegedly referred only to other texts or discourses in which “the real” or an “outside” were banished to the realm of nostalgia.

In a similar fashion, Baudrillard, a “strong simulacrist,” claims that in the media and consumer society, people are caught up in the play of images, spectacles, and simulacra, that have less and less relationship to an outside, to an external “reality,” to such an extent that the very concepts of the social, political, or even “reality” no longer seem to have any meaning. And the narcoticized and mesmerized (some of Baudrillard's metaphors) media-saturated consciousness is in such a state of fascination with image and spectacle that the concept of meaning itself (which depends on stable boundaries, fixed structures, shared consensus) dissolves. In this alarming and novel postmodern situation, the referent, the behind and the outside, along with depth, essence, and reality all disappear, and with their disappearance, the possibility of all potential opposition vanishes as well. As simulations proliferate, they come to refer only to themselves: a carnival of mirrors reflecting images projected from other mirrors onto the omnipresent television and computer screen and the screen of consciousness, which in turn refers the image to its previous storehouse of images also produced by simulatory mirrors. Caught up in the universe of simulations, the “masses” are “bathed in a media massage” without messages or meaning, a mass age where classes disappear, and politics is dead, as are the grand dreams of disalienation, liberation, and revolution.

Baudrillard claims that henceforth the masses seek spectacle and not meaning. They implode into a “silent majority,” signifying “the end of the social” (1983b). Baudrillard implies that social theory loses its very object as meanings, classes, and difference implode into a “black hole” of non-differentiation. Fixed distinctions between social groupings and ideologies implode and concrete face-to-face social relations recede as individuals disappear in worlds of simulation — media, computers, virtual reality itself. Social theory itself thus loses its object, the social, while radical politics loses its subject and agency.

Nonetheless, he claims, at this point in his trajectory (i.e., the late 1970s and early 1980s) that refusal of meaning and participation by the masses is a form of resistance. Hovering between nostalgia and nihilism, Baudrillard at once exterminates modern ideas (e.g., the subject, meaning, truth, reality, society, socialism, and emancipation) and affirms a mode of symbolic exchange which appears to manifest a nostalgic desire to return to premodern cultural forms. This desperate search for a genuinely revolutionary alternative was abandoned, however, by the early 1980s. Henceforth, he develops yet more novel perspectives on the contemporary moment, vacillating between sketching out alternative modes of thought and behavior and renouncing the quest for political and social change.

In a sense, there is a parodic inversion of historical materialism in Baudrillard. In place of Marx's emphasis on political economy and the primacy of the economic, for Baudrillard it is the model, the superstructure, that generates the real in a situation he refers to as the “end of political economy” (1993a). For Baudrillard, sign values predominate over use values and exchange values; the materiality of needs and commodity use-values to serve them disappear in Baudrillard's semiological imaginary, in which signs take precedence over the real and reconstruct human life. Turning the Marxist categories against themselves, masses absorb classes, the subject of praxis is fractured, and objects come to rule human beings. Revolution is absorbed by the object of critique and technological implosion replaces the socialist revolution in producing a rupture in history. For Baudrillard, in contrast to Marx, the catastrophe of modernity and eruption of postmodernity is produced by the unfolding of technological revolution. Consequently, Baudrillard replaces Marx's hard economic and social determinism with its emphasis on the economic dimension, class struggle, and human praxis, with a form of semiological idealism and technological determinism where signs and objects come to dominate the subject.

Baudrillard thus concludes that the “catastrophe has happened,” that the destruction of modernity and modern theory which he noted in the mid-1970s, has been completed by the development of capitalist society itself, that modernity has disappeared and a new social situation has taken its place. Against traditional strategies of rebellion and revolution, Baudrillard begins to champion what he calls “fatal strategies” that push the values of the system to the extreme in the hopes of collapse or reversal, and eventually adopts a style of highly ironic metaphysical discourse that renounces emancipation and the discourse and hopes of progressive social transformation.